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We consider secret-key distillation from tripartite compound classical-quantum-quantum (cqq)
sources with free forward public communication under strong security criterion. We design protocols
which are universally reliable and secure in this scenario. These are shown to achieve asymptotically
optimal rates as long as a certain regularity condition is fulfilled by the the set of its generating density
matrices. We derive a multi-letter formula which describes the optimal forward secret-key capacity
for all compound cqq sources being regular in this sense. We also determine the forward secret-
key distillation capacity for situations, where the legitimate sending party has perfect knowledge of
his/her marginal state deriving from the source statistics. In this case regularity conditions can be
dropped. Our results show that the capacities with and without the mentioned kind of state knowl-
edge are equal as long as the source is generated by a regular set of density matrices. We demonstrate
that regularity of cqq sources is not only a technical but also an operational issue. For this reason, we
give an example of a source which has zero secret-key distillation capacity without sender knowledge,
while achieving positive rates is possible if sender marginal knowledge is provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
Common randomness shared by communication parties which is moreover uncorrelated to an eaves-
dropping third party is well known as a valuable resource in information theory. This fact becomes
apparent e.g. when legitimate parties use a one-time pad coding [24] procedure to securely randomize
codewords. In this way, they can enhance the security of messages sent over an insecure transmission line.
A possible way to generate this resource is, to distill it from potentially noisy and insecure correlations
preshared by the parties. Design of protocols for secret-key distillation initially has been a domain of com-
plexity theory [17]. The complexity approach to cryptography gains its power from exploiting assumed
limited computational capabilities of eavesdropping parties. In such a setting, cooperation of legitimate
parties leads to substantial advantages when applying high-complexity protocols.
A disadvantage of the mentioned kind of strategies is that security is obtained under presuming of limita-
tion of the eavesdropper’s technical abilities. Such assumptions are rather restrictive, since eavesdropping
parties may improve their abilities by technological progress.
This paper follows the so-called information-theoretic approach to security, where rather the principal
statistical limitations of the eavesdropping parties are utilized to obtain security. Initiated by works of
Ahlswede and Csisza´r [1] and Maurer [21], this direction was intensively studied in the past decades. Re-
cent developments indicate that integrating security on the physical layer of communication systems more
and more heads towards technological application [26].
In this flavour, information-theoretic methods of secret-key distillation were also studied for quantum
systems in [15], where the secret-key distillation of classical-quantum-quantum sources and completely
quantum sources were studied.
However, to obtain the mentioned results, the sources under consideration were assumed to producemem-
oryless outputs with statistical properties being perfectly known to the legitimate parties. Since these con-
ditions are rather restrictive in real-world applications, we drop the second of the above conditions and
assume presence of a compound memoryless quantum source. In this model, the source is memoryless,
but the legitimate communication parties are assumed to have only incomplete knowledge of the generat-
ing density matrix. Instead of knowing it precisely, they are only provided with knowledge of a subset of
states, containing the source states which possibly occur.
Consequently, the legitimate parties have to apply protocols which have the property to simultaneously
generate secure common randomness for each of the possible states from the prescribed set.
The contributions of this paper are the following. We consider presence of a compound memoryless
classical-quantum-quantum (cqq) source where one receiver is assumed to receive outputs of classical
nature, while the remaining communication parties receive quantum systems. The classical systems-
receiving party is also allowed for public communication of classical messages to support the distillation
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2process. We consider a strong security criterion and design for given compound source universal protocols
for secret-key distillation.
It turns out that some compound cqq sources have rather unsuitable structure for generating secret-keys.
This fact leads us to introducing a regularity condition on sets of cqq density matrices. We demand the
possible sets of marginal states of the sender-legitimate receiver and sender-eavesdropper systems only
to differ in a controllable amount when the derived marginals on the sender’s systems are close. For the
class of density matrices fulfilling the regularity property, the approximation methods we develop lead to
a proof of achievability, whose optimal rates are also optimal in general, i.e. we obtain a full characteriza-
tion of the forward secret-key capacity.
We also consider the case, where the sending party is equipped with sender marginal information (SMI),
i.e. perfect knowledge of the marginal distribution on his/her systems deriving from the source statistics.
The forward secret-key capacities in both mentioned models are shown to be equal as long as the source is
regular. Moreover, the formula derived is shown to be also valid for all irregular sources if SMI is granted.
The reader may ask for a general proof of validity of the mentioned capacity formula also for case the
without SMI. Regarding this question we prove a disappointing negative result. The forward secret-key
distillation capacities with and without sender state information differ substantially for some compound
cqq sources.
Things get even harder. The counterexample we introduce shows that the legitimate parties can achieve
strictly positive key rates with zero error and perfect security of the key in case they are provided with
SMI, while they are unable to achieve any positive rate without this additional knowledge. These find-
ings shed some light on the structure of compound cqq sources. Even if there may be weaker regularity
conditions than the one presented here which lead to a general capacity formula, the notion of regularity
bears an operational core. While perfect knowledge of the sender’s marginal state does not help to achieve
higher forward secret-key distillation rates for regular sources, irregularity of the source can split values
of both capacities.
We conclude the paper with applying notions from the general theory of set-valued functions on the issue
of regularity of cqq sources. We show that a weaker condition on the source is sufficient to obtain regular-
ity in the sense defined. It turns out that lower hemi-continuity of the set-valued functions mapping each
marginal distribution on the sender’s systems to the sets of sender-eavesdropper and sender-legitimate
receiver marginals consistent with this distributions is generally sufficient to prove a capacity formula.
Related work
The information-theoretic approach to security was initiated in classical information theory by the
works of Ahlswede and Csisza´r [1], where among other results the capacity for generation of secret-keys
from perfectly known tripartite classical memoryless sources with free one-way public communication
were determined. The research area opened by the aforementioned work led to many relevant considera-
tions. We mention [12] where the secret-key distillation capacity was also determined under constraints
on the classical forward communication rate. An excellent overview of the research activities done on the
field can be found in Chapter 17 in [14].
The first results regarding information-theoretic security were obtained under a rather weak security cri-
terion where the measures of security appeared as quantities regularized in blocklength. These notions
were improved in [11], and [22], where first results using so-called strong security criteria were proven.
In this work, we define a quantum version of the strong security index known from classical information
theory (see [14] for further information).
The spirit of [1] was injected to quantum information theory by Devetak and Winter[15] where corre-
sponding results were proven under the more general assumption that the correlation used for secret-key
generation are obtained from outputs of memoryless sources of possibly non-classical nature, while the
statistics of the source are perfectly known to the communication parties. The compound source model
was hardly considered including security constraints even in classical information theory. A first attempt
to generalize some of the aforementioned results to the case of classical compound memoryless sources
was pursued in [9], and [23] under collaboration of the first author of this paper. In the latter of the men-
tioned papers, the forward secret-key distillation capacity of a classical compound source was determined
for the case of a finite number of possible marginal states on the sender’s systems. Also a lower bound on
the capacity under restriction of the forward public communication was derived therein.
3Outline
In Section II we fix notation and introduce some conventions, we freely use in our considerations. We
precisely state the relevant definitions and our main results in Section III. Therein, we also introduce a cer-
tain regularity condition for sets of cqq density matrices. This condition is defined in terms of Hausdorff
continuity of the map connecting each possible marginal probability distribution on the sender’s system
with the cqq density matrices from the compound source generating set being consistent with it.
In Sect. IV we provide a full proof of our main result, where we derive a multi-letter capacity formula for
the forward secret-key distillation capacity for compound sources which fulfill the mentioned regularity
conditions.
We may drop the regularity condition if we assume the sender to have perfect knowledge of his marginal
distribution. In Section V, we prove a full coding theorem to determine the secret-key distillation capac-
ity of compound memoryless cqq sources in case of sender marginal information (SMI). It turns out that
for regular sources, the secret-key distillation capacities with and without SMI are equal. However, the
capacities do not match in general, when we are facing an irregular source. This claim is substantiated
in Section VIA, where we provide an example of a compound cqq source with a substantial gap between
the forward secret-key distillation capacities with and without SMI. In Section VI B, we apply the general
theory of set-valued maps to derive a weaker regularity condition. We show that the definitions given in
Section III implicitly allow to weaken the mentioned condition to lower hemi-continuity.
Even in case of a fully classical source, the forward secret-key distillation capacity was yet only deter-
mined on a lower level of generality[23]. Therefore we indicate that our considerations also include the
completely classical setting as a special case. We conclude the paper with some general remarks in Section
VIII, where we especially point out the relation of our results to the problem of one-way LOCC entangle-
ment distillation from bipartite compound quantum sources.
II. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS
All Hilbert spaces appearing in this work are considered to be finite dimensional complex vector spaces.
L(H) is the set of linear maps and S (H) the set of states (density matrices) on a Hilbert space H in our
notation. For a finite alphabet X and a Hilbert spaceK, we denote by CQ(X ,K) the set of classical-quantum
channels, i.e. maps from X to S (K). The set of completely positive and trace preserving (c.p.t.p.) maps
from L(H) to L(K) is denoted C(H,K).
Regarding states on multiparty systems, we freely make use of the following convention for a system
consisting of some parties X,Y ,Z , for instance, we denoteHXYZ :=HX ⊗HY ⊗HZ , while the marginals are
labeled by indices assigned to the corresponding subsystems, i.e. σXZ := trHY (σ) for σ ∈ S (HXYZ ) and so
on. The von Neumann entropy of a quantum state ρ is defined by
S(ρ) := −tr(ρ logρ),
where we denote by log(·) and exp(·) the base two logarithms and exponentials throughout this paper. For
each cq channel V ∈ CQ(X ,K) and probability distribution p on X , we define the Holevo quantity by
χ(p,V ) := S

∑
x∈X
p(x) V (x)
−
∑
x∈X
p(x) S(V (x)).
Given a quantum state ρ on HXY , we denote the conditional von Neumann entropy of ρ given Y by
S(X |Y,ρ) := S(ρ)− S(ρY ),
the quantum mutual information by
I(X;Y,ρ) := S(ρX ) + S(ρY )− S(ρ).
A convenient way of representing systems which have quantum as well as classical subsystems is by co-
herifying the classical systems. The density matrix
ρ :=
∑
x∈X
PX(x) |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρx ∈ S (HX ⊗KB) (1)
represents a density matrix of a source, where the statistics of a subsystem is driven by a classical random
variable X with values in X and ρx ∈ S (KB) is a density matrix on KB for each x ∈ X . A quantum system
4with Hilbert space HX := C|X | was introduced where each x ∈ X corresponds to the element |x〉 of a once
and for all fixed orthonormal basis (we may assume that this is for each system introduced the canonical
basis). We set the convention to indicate the quantum systems belonging to coherified classical systems by
the corresponding random variable. This convention extends to notation of entropic quantities. E.g.
I(X;B,ρ) =H(X) + S(ρB)− S(ρ). (2)
corresponds to the quantum mutual information of the state ρ in (1). The conditional quantum mutual
information of a density matrix σABX is defined
I(A;B|X,σ) := S(σAX ) + S(σBX )− S(σABX )− S(σX ).
If X belongs to a classical system i.e
σ =
∑
x∈X
PX(x) |x〉〈x| ⊗ σAB,x
with σAB,x being a bipartite density matrix on the remaining systems Hilbert spaces, it holds
I(A;B|X,σ) =
∑
x∈X
PX(x) I(A;B,ρAB,x).
Whenever informational quantities are evaluated on classical systems, we feel free to express them in
terms of the corresponding classical informational quantities evaluated on the corresponding probability
distributions resp. random variables where we completely adopt the notation and calculation rules as
presented in Ref [14] if no further reference is given.
From [14], we also take the definition and properties of types and typical sequences. For given alphabet
X and n ∈N (which we always regard being finite) we denote the set of probability distributions on X as
P(X ). We will use [N ] use as a shortcut for the set {1, . . . ,N } for each N ∈N. The set of types (i.e. empirical
distributions) on X n is denoted by T(n,X ), it holds
|T(n,X )| ≤ (n+1)|X | (n ∈N).
For given type λ ∈ T (n,X ), we denote the set of λ-typical words in X n by T nλ . For each δ > 0, p ∈ P(X ), the
set of δ-typical sequences for p in X n is defined by
T np,δ :=
{
xn ∈ X n : ∀a ∈ X : | 1nN (a|xn)− p(a)| ≤ δ ∧ p(a) = 0⇒N (a|xn) = 0
}
, (3)
where N (a|xn) is the number of occurrences of a in xn. Several kinds of bounds are known for these sets,
we will explicitly employ the bound
pn
(
(T np,δ)
c
)
≤ 2−ncδ2 (4)
on the probability of the complement of a δ-typical set, which holds with c := 2ln2 for each δ > 0 and large
enough n.
For any two nonempty sets I,I′ of states on a Hilbert spaceH, the Hausdorff distance (induced by the trace
norm ‖ · ‖1) is defined by
dH (I,I
′) := max
{
sup
σ∈I
inf
σ ′∈I′
‖σ −σ ′‖1, sup
σ ′∈I′
inf
σ∈I
‖σ −σ ′‖1
}
= inf{ǫ > 0 : I′ ⊂ Iǫ ∧ I ⊂ I′ǫ}
where Aǫ denotes the ǫ-blowup of A (with regard to ‖ · ‖1) for each set A. On the set of subsets of a
bounded set, dH has only finite values. If the set of compact subsets of such a bounded set are regarded,
dH becomes a full metric. Several properties of the Hausdorff distance are directly inherited from 1-norm
on the underlying space. We will frequently use the triangle inequality
dH (A,C) ≤ dH (A,B) + dH (B,C) (A,B,C ⊂ S (H)) (5)
and monotonicity of dH under c.p.t.p. maps, i.e. for each N ∈ C(H,K), A,B ∈ S (H), it holds
dH (A,B) ≥ dH (N (A),N (B)), (6)
where N (C) is the image of each set C ⊂ L(H) under N .
5III. BASIC DEFINITIONS ANDMAIN RESULT
In this section we give precise definitions of the secret-key distillations task and the corresponding
capacities of compound memoryless cqq sources with and without assumption of SMI. We also state the
two main results Theorem 8 and Theorem 9.
A. Source model
A compound memoryless quantum source generated by a set of density matrices I ⊂ S (K) on a Hilbert
space K is the source described by the set of possible output density matrices
I⊗n := {ρ⊗n : ρ ∈ I}
for each blocklength n ∈N. This source definition models a situation, where the source statistics is memo-
ryless, but the generating density matrix is not perfectly known to the communication parties. They only
can be sure that the output statistics is governed by memoryless extensions of a density matrix from I
(in our case the density matrix is not known perfectly to the legitimate users of the systems, while the
eavesdropper is allowed to have this information).
To gain some notational flexibility, we will also write I = {ρs}s∈S where S is a suitable index set. In general
we do not place restrictions on the set I to be finite or countable. The reader may check that most of the
technicalities in our considerations would become obsolete if I was regarded to be finite. In this paper, the
compound sources considered are generated by tripartite classical-quantum density matrix of the form
ρ :=
∑
x∈X
p(x) |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρBE,x ∈ S (HA ⊗HB ⊗HE)
which is the coherified way to represent a statistics where A receives outputs of a classical source with
distribution p ∈ P(X ), while B, and E receive quantum systems with joint state ρBE,x ∈ S (HBE ), dependent
on the letter x. If a system is classical, we regard the basis used for coherifying the systems as fixed once
and for all (we fix it to be the canonical basis).
Note that ρ can be alternatively described by the pair (p,V ) with p ∈ P(X ) being a probability distribution
on X and V ∈ CQ(X ,HBE ) with
V (x) := ρBE,x ,
notations, we will use interchangeably. Note that
I(X;BE,ρ) = χ(p,V ).
We define the class of density matrices in S (HABE ) with classical A-system, HA :=C|X | by
Scqq(HABE ) :=
ρ =
∑
x∈X
p(x) |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρx : p ∈ P(X ) and ρx ∈ S (HBE ) (x ∈ X )
 .
Since bipartite sources with a classical and a quantum subsystem also occur, we also define
Scq(HAB) :=
ρ =
∑
x∈X
p(x) |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρx : p ∈ P(X ) and ρx ∈ S (HB) (x ∈ X )
 .
To increase notational flexibility within our considerations, we define for each given set I ⊂ Scqq(HABE )
PI :=
p ∈ P(X ) : ∃ρ ∈ I with ρA =
∑
x∈X
p(x) |x〉〈x|
 , and
Ip :=
ρ ∈ I : ρA :=
∑
x∈X
p(x) |x〉〈x|

for each p ∈ PI. With these notations, PI is the set of marginal probability distributions which can occur at
the sender’s site, while Ip collects for each p all cqq density matrices which have p as marginal distribution
6on the sender’s systems. For a more efficient notation of the capacity formulas appearing below, we also
define the following sets of marginal distributions deriving from states in Ip by
IABp := {ρAB : ρ ∈ Ip}, IAEp = {ρAE : ρ ∈ Ip}
for each p ∈ PI.
In this paper, the systems labeled A, and B belong to the legitimate communication parties, while E labels
the systems of the eavesdropper. The definitions in the next section model a situation, where the legitimate
parties do not know, which density matrix from I governs the source statistics (except the SMI case, where
A knows his/her marginal statistics). The eavesdropper instead, may know the source statistics and the
protocols applied by the legitimate users.
B. Secret-key generation from compound cqq sources: Definitions and results
For a cqq source with fixed density matrix ρ ∈ Scqq(HABE ), HA = C|X |, a secret-key generation protocol
for given blocklength n is performed, informally speaking, as follows. The A-party generates from his/her
source output messages l and m where m is the the key value for A and l is broadcasted to the remaining
parties via a noiseless channel. The legitimate receiver subsequently determines a key value by applying
a quantum measurement, which can be chosen according to the received message l. This results in a tuple
(K,K ′ ,Λ,Xn) of random variables, where K (K ′) is the key random value of A (B), Λ the random variable
representing the public transmission, and Xn the classical random variable initially received by A. The
formal definition for the described type of protocol is as follows.
Definition 1. An (n,M,L) (forward) secret-key distillation protocol for states on Scqq(HABE ) is a pair (T ,D),
with T : X n → P([L]× [M]) being a stochastic matrix, and D = {Dlm}l∈[L],m∈[M] being a set of matrices, 0 ≤Dlm ≤
1
⊗n
HB such that
M∑
m=1
Dlm = 1
⊗n
HB
holds for each l ∈ [L].
We will also consider the situation, where the sender has full knowledge of the statistics of his/her part
of the source. If this is assumed, the sender can choose the stochastic matrix of a protocol according to this
knowledge.
Definition 2. An (n,M,L) (forward) secret-key distillation protocol with sender marginal information
(SMI) for a set I ⊂ Scqq(HABE ) is a family (Tp ,D)p∈PI , with (Tp ,D) being an (n,M,L) forward secret key dis-
tillation protocol for states on Scqq(HABE ) for each p ∈ PI.
Next, we define the performance of (n,L,M) forward secret-key distillation protocols with and without
SMI performed on a compound source generated by a set I := {ρs}s∈S ⊂ Scqq(HABE ). For a protocol with
SMI, (Tp ,D) is performed, if the cqq density matrix belongs to Ip . It is convenient, to express the aftermath
in coherified manner by the state
ρΛKK ′En ,s :=
L∑
l=1
M∑
m,m′=1
∑
xn∈X n
pn(xn) Tp(l,m|xn) |l〉〈l | ⊗ |m〉〈m|
⊗ |m′〉〈m′ | ⊗ trH⊗nB ((Dlm′ ⊗1
⊗n
HE )V
⊗n(xn)) (7)
when the state governing the statistics of the source is
ρs =
∑
x∈X
p(x) |x〉〈x| ⊗V (x).
We are especially interested in the corresponding marginal state
ρΛKEn ,s :=
L∑
l=1
M∑
m=1
∑
xn∈X n
pn(xn) Tp(l,m|xn)tr(Dlm′V ⊗nB (xn)) |l〉〈l | ⊗ |m〉〈m| ⊗V ⊗nE (xn),
7and the probability distribution (Ks ,K
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s ) belonging to the key given by
PKK ′ ,s(m,m
′) = 〈m⊗m′ ,ρKK ′ ,s m⊗m′〉 =
L∑
l=1
∑
xn∈X n
pn(xn) Tp(l,m|xn)tr(Dlm′V ⊗nB (xn))
for all m,m′ ∈ [M]. The case of application of a protocol without SMI can be regarded as the special case,
where Tp does not depend on p. The following definition quantifies the performance of each (n,M,L)
forward secret-key distillation protocol with SMI when performed on a set of cqq density matrices. The
corresponding definition for the case without SMI is easily obtained by dropping all text in brackets from
the following definitions.
Definition 3. An (n,M,L) forward secret-key distillation protocol (with SMI) for a set I := {ρs}s∈S ⊂ Scqq(HABE )
is an (n,M,L,λ) forward secret-key distribution protocol (with SMI) for I if the inequalities
1. Pr(Ks , K
′
s ) ≤ λ, and
2. logM −H(Ks) + I(K ;EnΛ,ρΛKEn ,s) ≤ λ
are valid for all s ∈ S.
The first condition above is a bound on the probability that key values mismatch. The second one
guarantees for small λ that the key is approximately equidistributed and secure. The left hand side of the
inequality in 2. of the above definition can be regarded as a quantum version of the so-called security index
introduced in classical information theory [13]. For a pair (K,Z) of classical random variables, the security
index of K against Z is given by the expression
SSID(K |Z) := logsupp(PK )−H(K) + I(K ;Z).
The security index is well-known as a useful criterion for quantifying equidistribution and the degree
of decoupling from the eavesdropper (see e.g. [14] for more information). From the classical security
index, also the above introduced quantum version stems its operational significance. If (K,Λ,Z)s is a
tuple of random variables with Ks being the key random variable, Λs belonging to the public message of
the protocol and Zs the classical random variable obtained by any measurement on the eavesdropper’s
system, the second condition in Definition 3 implies SSID(Ks |ΛsZs) ≤ λ, because
SSID(Ks |Λs,Zs) = logM −H(Ks) + I(Ks;Zs,Λs) ≤ logM −H(Ks) + I(K ;EnΛ,ρΛKEn ,s) ≤ λ (8)
holds by the Holevo bound [20].
Remark 4. In [15], Devetak and Winter proposed a slightly stronger security criterion to be satisfied instead of
the one used in Definition 3. The authors of the present paper feel that in general the security criterion therein will
hardly be satisfied by universal secret-key distillation protocols in general. However, the results in the subsequent
sections applied to the case of a compound source I with |I| = 1 show that imposing the weaker criterion from
Definition 3 does not lead to higher capacities compared to [15] in case of perfectly known source statistics.
Definition 5. A nonnegative number R is called an achievable secret-key distillation rate for I (with SMI),
if for each ǫ > 0,δ > 0 exist numbers n0 and 0 < Rc < ∞ such for each possible marginal state ρA there is an
(n,M,L,ǫ) secret-key distillation protocol for I (with SMI), such that
M ≥ exp(n(R− δ)), and L ≤ exp(nRc) (9)
for each n > n0. We define the forward secret-key capacity of I with SMI by
K→,SMI (I) := sup{R ≥ 0 : R is an achievable secret-key distillation rate for I with SMI}. (10)
and the forward secret-key capacity of I without SMI by
K→(I) := sup{R ≥ 0 : R is an achievable secret-key distillation rate for I without SMI}.
What we define next, is a regularity condition on generating sets for compound cqq sources.
Definition 6 (Regularity Condition). We call a set I ⊂ Scqq(HABE )
8• ǫ-regular, if there is a δ > 0 such that the implication
‖p − q‖1 < δ ⇒ dH (IABp ,IABq ) + dH (IAEp ,IAEq ) < ǫ
holds for each pair p,q ∈ PI, where dH denotes the Hausdorff distance generated by the trace norm distance
on the underlying matrix spaces.
• regular, if I is ǫ-regular for each ǫ > 0.
Remark 7. The regularity condition given above aims to cover an as large as possible class of reasonable sets of
cqq density matrices under the condition that general protocol constructions are successful. The reader interested
in detailed discussion of this condition is referred to section VI. In Section VI B we show using results from the
theory of set-valued functions, that the above condition of regularity can be weakened somewhat to include even
a larger class of cqq sources.
The following two theorems state the main results proven in this paper.
Theorem 8. Let I be a regular set of cqq density matrices on HABE . It holds
K→(I) = lim
k→∞
1
k
K
(1)
→ (I⊗k ), (11)
where for a set A := {∑y∈Y p(y) |y〉〈y| ⊗ σy} ∈ Scqq(KABE ), KA :=C|Y | of cqq density matrices,
K
(1)
→ (A) := inf
p∈PA
sup
Γ:=T←U←Yp
 infσ∈ApI(U ;B|T ,σΓ)− supσ∈ApI(U ;E|T ,σΓ)
 .
The supremum above is over all Markov chains T ← U ← Yp resulting from application of Markov transition
matrices PT |U , PU |Y on p for each p ∈ p, and
σTU :=
∑
y∈Y
∑
t∈T
∑
u∈U
PT |U (t|u)PU |Y (u|y)p(y) |t〉〈t| ⊗ |u〉〈u| ⊗ σy
for given transition matrices PT |U , PU |Y when
σ =
∑
y∈Y
p(y) |y〉〈y| ⊗ σy .
Theorem 9. Let I be a set of cqq density matrices on HABE . It holds
K→,SMI (I) = lim
k→∞
1
k
K
(1)
→ (I⊗k ), (12)
where the function K (1) is defined in the preceding theorem.
Notice that the inequality
K→(I) ≤ K→,SMI (I) (13)
holds for each I. This can be directly observed from the definitions of achievable rates given above. The
next section is devoted to giving a full argument which justifies the claim of Theorem 8. Here we give a
short outline of the proof. In a sequence of propositions with increasing level of approximation we prepare
ourselves for proving the assertion
K→(I) ≥ K (1)→ (I) (14)
in Proposition 15. For this reason, we first design suitable protocols of suboptimal rate for the special case
of a source parameterized by a full Cartesian product of probability distributions and cq channels. We
improve the bounds in Proposition 14, where we derive protocols suitable for the same type of source, but
including sender preprocessing of the source by a fixed Markov chain for optimization. Finally, this result
is combined with a fine-grained approximation of an arbitrary regular source by a number of sources of
type subject to the mentioned propositions. The proof of achievability (i.e. the lower bound in (12)) follows
9almost immediately from (14), since we show that regularity of I implies, for each k ∈N, regularity of the
set I⊗k of all k-fold tensor extensions for states from I.
In Section V we give a full proof of Theorem 9. The achievability part therein is derived from the results
gathered in Section IV. The protocol construction used for proving achievability in Theorem 8 can be
employed in case of SMI. To do so we use a certain type of finite covering on the power set of Scqq(HABE )
to decompose a general set I into a finite family of regular sets. Moreover, we provide a proof to the
corresponding upper bound on the forward key capacity.
The reader may ask, whether Theorem 8 may hold also without assumption of regularity. We give a
negative answer to this question in Section VI, where an example of a cqq set of density matrices with
K→(I) < K→,SMI (I)
is established.
IV. SECRET-KEY DISTILLATIONWITHOUT STATE KNOWLEDGE
In this chapter, we give a detailed argument to prove Theorem 8. The first assertion, we prove is on
a restricted type of cqq density matrices. Assume Q ⊂ P(Y ) be a set of probability distributions and
V ⊂ CQ(Y ,KBE ) be a set of cq-channels. We define
ρ(p,V ) :=
∑
y∈Y
p(y) |y〉〈y| ⊗V (y) (p ∈ Q, V ∈ V ),
and the set
J :=
{
ρ(p,V )
}
(p,V )∈Q×V . (15)
We set VB = trKB ◦V , and VE = trKE ◦V for each V ∈ V .
Proposition 10. Let J be the source defined in (15), and δ > 0. There is a constant c1 > 0 and a number n0 such
that for each n > n0 there is an (n,M,L,µ) forward secret-key distillation protocol with
1
n
logM ≥ inf
q∈Q
(
inf
V∈V
χ(q,VB)− sup
V∈V
χ(q,VE )
)
− δ
1
n
logL ≤ sup
p∈PJ
(
H(p)− inf
V∈V
χ(p,VB)
)
+ δ
µ ≤ 2− 16
√
nc1 .
Within the proof of Proposition 10 we will use some auxiliary results, we introduce first. The following
lemma states, for given compound memoryless classical-quantum channel (DMcqC) existence of random
codes being of constant composition (i.e. all codewords having the very same type) and equidistributed
over the typical sets. The assertion is a direct consequence of coding results stated in Appendix A, where
also the basic definitions regarding codes for message transmission over compound DMcq channels can be
found.
Lemma 11. Let V ⊂ CQ(X ,K) be a set of cq channels. For each γ > 0, there is a number n1(γ,V ) such that for
each n > n1(γ) and each type λ ∈ T(n,X ) the following assertion is true.
There exists a random (n,Mλ)-code
C(U ) := (Um,Dm(U ))Mλm=1
fulfilling the following three properties
1. U = (U1, . . . ,UMλ ) is an i.i.d. sequence of random variables, such that Um is equidistributed on T
n
λ for each
m ∈ [Mλ],
2. Mλ ≥ exp
(
n
(
inf
V∈V
χ(λ,V )−γ
))
3. E
[
sup
V∈V
e(C(U ),V ⊗n)
]
≤ 2− 16
√
ncˆ.
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with a constant cˆ(γ,V ) > 0 (independent of λ).
Proof. We need only consider types with
inf
V∈V
χ(λ,V )−γ > 0, (16)
since for all other types, the bounds in the assertion of the lemma can be satisfied by trivial coding. Setting
δ :=
γ
2 in Proposition 30 in Appendix A, ensures us, that for each large enough blocklength n and each
type λ ∈ T(n,X ) the hypothesis of Proposition 31 is fulfilled with anM ′λ which fulfills
M ′λ ≥ exp
(
n
(
inf
V∈V
χ(λ,V )− γ
2
))
> 2n
γ
2 (17)
and µ ≤ 2− 16
√
nc(
γ
2 ). Note that the rightmost inequality in (17) is satisfied because we only consider types,
which fulfill the condition in (16). Setting ϑ := 12 , we conclude with Proposition 31 that we find, for large
enough n ∈N and random (n,Mλ) message transmission code fulfilling the properties demanded.
The following matrix covering lemma results from the powerful matrix Chernov bound [2] and was
proven in [15].
Proposition 12 ([15], Prop. 2.4). Let n ∈N, W ∈ CQ(X ,K), λ ∈ T(k,X ), U := (U1, . . . ,UM ) an i.i.d. sequence
of random variables generically equidistributed on T nλ , and
σn,λ(W ) :=
1
|T nλ |
∑
xn∈T nλ
W⊗n(xn).
For each ǫ,δ > 0, there is a number k := k(ǫ,δ), such that if n > k, then
Pr

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
M
M∑
m=1
W⊗n(Um)−σn,λ(W )
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≥ ǫ
 ≤ 2 ·dimKn · exp(−M∆n · ǫ)
holds with
∆n := − 1288ln2 · exp(−n(χ(λ,W )− δ))
The next assertion will help us to approximate the set V assumed in Proposition 10 by a finite subset in
a suitable way.
Lemma 13. Let V ⊂ CQ(X ,K) be a set of classical quantum channels. For each α ∈ (0, 1e ) exists a subset Vα ⊂ V ,
which fulfills the following three conditions.
1. |Vα | ≤
(
6
α
)2|X |dimK2
2. Given any n ∈N, to each V ∈ V exists aW ∈ Vα , such that
‖V ⊗n(xn)−W⊗n(xn)‖1 ≤ 2nα
holds for each xn ∈ X n.
3. For each p ∈ P(X ), it holds
∣∣∣∣∣minW∈Vα χ(p,W )− infV∈V χ(p,V )
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2α log dimK2α .
Proof of Proposition 10. Set
R := inf
q∈Q
(
inf
V∈V
χ(q,VB)− sup
V∈V
χ(q,VE )
)
,
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and let δ > 0 be a number small enough for fulfilling R − δ > 0, otherwise, there is nothing left to prove.
Let 12 > η > 0, be fixed and small enough such that the inequality
12η + logdimKBE +4h(2η) ≤ δ16 . (18)
is valid. Let n ∈N be large enough to simultaneously satisfy
1
n
≤ 1
16
δ and
1
n
≤ 2η. (19)
Define
Tn :=T(n,Y )∩Qη ,
where Qη := {q ∈ P(Y ) : ∃p ∈ Q : ‖p − q‖1 ≤ η} is the η-blowup of Q regarding the variational distance. We
set for each probability distribution q ∈ P(Y )
χB,q := inf
V∈V
χ(q,VB),
χE,q := sup
V∈V
χ(q,VE ),
χq := χB,q −χE,q ,
and
χn := min
λ∈Tn
χλ.
Our choice of η and n implies
dH (Tn,Q) ≤ dH (Tn,Qη ) + dH (Qη ,Q) ≤ 12n + η ≤ 2η, (20)
where the first inequality above is the triangle inequality for the Hausdorff distance, and the second is by
(19). From (20), and (18) together with twofold application of Lemma 35, we infer
|χn −R| ≤ δ16 . (21)
Set, for each λ ∈ Tn
Lλ :=
⌊
exp
(
n(H(λ)−χB,λ + 34δ)
)⌋
,
Sλ :=
⌈
exp
(
n(χE,λ +χλ −χn + 34δ)
)⌉
, and
M :=
⌊
exp(n(R− δ))⌋ .
The above definitions, together with (21) and the second inequality of (19) the bounds
M · Sλ ≤ exp
(
n(χB,λ − 78δ)
)
, (22)
M · Lλ ≤ exp
(
n(H(λ)−χE,λ − 78δ)
)
, and (23)
Γλ :=
Lλ · Sλ ·M
|T nλ |
≥ 2n 118 δ. (24)
are valid. The strategy for the rest of the proof is the following. We will in a first step, generate a class of
one-way-secret-key distribution protocols for J, and then show that with high probability, the protocols
meet the properties demanded.
Define for each λ ∈ Tn a random matrix
U (λ) := (Uλlms)(l,m,s)∈[Lλ]×[M]×[Sλ]
with all entries being independent and generically equidistributed on T nλ . We collect the matrices defined
above in an independent family
U := {U (λ)}λ∈Tn .
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Define, for each yn ∈ Yn, λ ∈ Tn a random set
Aλ(y
n,U) :=
{
(λ,l,m,s) : Uλlms = y
n
}
.
Obviously, the sets defined above fulfill for each outcome u of U, λ ∈ Tn the following relations
Aλ(y
n,u) = ∅ (yn < T nλ ),
Aλ(y
n,u)∩Aλ(zn,u) = ∅ (yn , zn),
and
⋃
yn∈T nλ
Aλ(y
n,u) = {λ} × [Lλ]× [M]× [Sλ]. (25)
We regard, for each λ ∈ Tn and l ∈ [Lλ],
Uλ,l := (U
λ
lms)(m,s)∈[M]×[Sλ]
as a random i.i.d. constant composition codebook of size M · Sλ with codewords equidistributed over T nλ .
Since we have the bound in (22), we know from Lemma 11 that there is a random (n,M · Sλ) constant
composition code
Cλ,l (Uλ,l ) := (Uλlms ,Dλlms)(m,s)∈[M]×[Sλ]
for the compound DMcqC generated by VB := {VB : V ∈ V } which has expected average error bounded
E
 sup
V∈Vλ
e(Cλ,l (Uλ,l ),V ⊗nB )
 ≤ 2− 16
√
ncˆ =: β0 (26)
with a strictly positive constant cˆ independent of λ. Define, for β3 > 0, λ ∈ Tn a random set
Bλ(U,β3) :=
{
l ∈ [Lλ] : max
V∈V
e
(
Cλ,l (Uλ,l ),V ⊗nB
)
< β3
}
,
which collects all indices l ∈ [Lλ], such that Cλ,l is β3-good regarding the average error criterion. Define a
random stochastic matrix
TU : X → P (T(n,Y )× [Lλ]× [M]× [Sλ])
with entries
TU(λ,l,m,s|yn) :=
{|Aλ(yn,U)|−1 if (λ,l,m,s) ∈ Aλ(yn,U)
0 otherwise
for each λ ∈ Tn. The values of TU(λ,l,m,s|yn) with λ being not in Tn will be of no special interest for us, so
they may be defined in any consistent way. Let, for each λ ∈ Tn, V ∈ V
σλ(V ) :=
1
|T nλ |
∑
yn∈T nλ
V ⊗nE (y
n).
Note that
σλ(V ) =E
[
V ⊗nE (U
λ
lms)
]
(27)
holds for all (l,m,s) ∈ [Lλ] × [M] × [Sλ]. Define, for λ ∈ Tn, β1,β2,β3 > 0 and each outcome u of U, the
following sets.
C
(1)
λ (β1) :=
{
u : ∀yn ∈ T nλ : (1− β1)Γλ ≤ |Aλ(yn,u)| ≤ (1 + β1Γλ)
}
C
(2)
λ (β2) :=
u : ∀(l,m) ∈ [Lλ]× [M],V ∈ V : ‖
1
Sλ
Sλ∑
s=1
V ⊗nE (u
λ
lms)−σλ(V )‖1 ≤ β2

C
(3)
λ (β3) := {u : |Bλ(u,β3)| ≥ (1− 2β3)Lλ} , and
A :=
⋂
λ∈Tn
3⋂
i=1
C
(i)
λ (βi ).
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Eventually, we will show that if an outcome u of U is an element of A, it generates a suitable protocol for
our needs. First we make sure that for the right choice of parameters and each large enough blocklength,
A is actually nonempty, which we do by actually bounding the r.h.s. of
Pr(Ac) ≤
3∑
i=1
∑
λ∈Tn
Pr
(
C
(i)
λ (βi )
c
)
(28)
away from one. In the following we separately derive a bound on each of the summands on the right hand
side of (28). Let λ be a type from Tn. Note that
|Aλ(yn,u)| =
Lλ∑
l=1
M∑
m=1
Sλ∑
s=1
1yn(u
λ
lms)
holds, where 1 is the indicator function, therefore,
E[|Aλ(yn,u)|] = LλMSλ|T nλ |
= Γλ ≥ 2−n
11
8 δ
where the rightmost inequality above results from (24). We infer
Pr
(
C
(1)
λ (β1)
c
)
=
∑
yn∈Yn
Pr({u : |Aλ(yn,u)| < ((1− β1)Γλ, (1 + β1)Γλ)})
≤ 2|Y |n · exp
(
−Γλβ21 /(2ln2)
)
≤ 2 · exp(−2n 98 δ)
for large enough blocklength n, where the first inequality above is by Chernov-bounding with Proposition
32, and the second is by (24) together with the choice
β1 = 2
−n δ8 . (29)
To bound the summands with i = 2, we choose an approximating set Vˆn for V according to Lemma 13 with
parameter
α := 2−
16√ncˆ/(16|Y |dimK2BE ).
which is possible with cardinality
|Vˆn| ≤ 2−
16√n cˆ4
as long as n is large enough. Let for given V ∈ V , W ∈ Vˆn be a channel, such that ‖V (x) −W (x)‖ ≤ 2α. It
holds for each λ ∈ Tn, l ∈ [Lλ], m ∈ [M]
‖ 1
Sλ
Sλ∑
s=1
V ⊗nE (y
n)−σλ(V )‖1 ≤ ‖ 1Sλ
Sλ∑
s=1
W⊗nE (y
n)−σλ(W )‖1 (30)
+ ‖ 1
Sλ
Sλ∑
s=1
V ⊗nE (y
n)− 1
Sλ
Sλ∑
s=1
W⊗nE (y
n)‖1
+ ‖σλ(V )−σλ(W )‖1
≤ ‖ 1
Sλ
Sλ∑
s=1
W⊗nE (y
n)−σλ(W )‖1 +2nα. (31)
If we now choose
β2 = 4nα, (32)
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we can bound
Pr
(
C
(2)
λ (β2)
c
)
= Pr
∃(l,m),V ∈ V :
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
Sλ
Sλ∑
s=1
V ⊗nE (u
λ
lms)−σλ(V )
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
> β2

≤ Pr
∃(l,m),V ∈ Vˆn :
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
Sλ
Sλ∑
s=1
V ⊗nE (u
λ
lms)−σλ(V )
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
>
β2
2

≤ 4 · LλM |Vˆn| · (dimKE)n exp
(
−Sλ · 2−n(χE,λ−
δ
4 )
β2
576ln2
)
≤ exp
(
2−n
δ
4
)
,
where the first inequality is by (31), the second by application of Proposition 12, and the last inequality
holds for each large enough blocklength. At last,
Pr
(
C
(3)
λ (β3)
c
)
= Pr
 1Lλ
∑
l∈Lλ
1Bλ(β3,U)c (l) ≥ 2β3

<
E
[
1Bλ(β3,U)c (l)
]
2β3
<
β0
2β23
. (33)
The first inequality above is Markov’s inequality applied, the second can be justified as follows. It holds
E
[
1Bλ(β3,U)c (l)
]
= Pr(Bλ(U,β3)(l)
c))
= Pr
(
max
V∈V
e(Cλ,l ,V ⊗nB ) ≥ β3
)
≤
E
[
max
V∈V
e(Cλ,l ,V ⊗nB )
]
β3
≤ β0
β3
. (34)
The first inequality above is again by Markov-bounding. The second is by (26). By combination of the
estimate in (33), and the choice
β3 = 2
− 16√ncˆ/4 (35)
we yield, for large enough blocklength
Pr
(
C
(3)
λ (β3)
c
)
≤ 2− 16
√
ncˆ . (36)
Combining all the bounds derived above with (28), choosing the blocklength large enough, we arrive with
our choice of the parameters βi , 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 at
Pr (Ac) ≤ |Tn|2− 16
√
nc˜
with a strictly positive constant c˜ if n is large enough. Since |Tn| ≤ |T(n,Y )| ≤ (n + 1)|Y |, we have for each
large enough blocklength
Pr(Ac) ≤ 1
2
,
which implies that A is nonempty. Define
L := max
λ∈Tn
Lλ, and S := max
λ∈Tn
Sλ.
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We choose any u ∈ A and define a stochastic map
T : Yn → T(n,Y )× [L]× [M]
yn 7→ T (λ,l,m|yn) :=
S∑
s=1
Tu(λ,l,m,s|yn).
and
D := (Dλlm)λ∈T(n,Y ),l∈[L],m∈[M],
where
Dλlm :=
S∑
s=1
Dλlms (λ,l,m) ∈ T(n,Y )× [L]× [M]
with Dλlms being the decoding set with index (m,s) from the code Cλ,l (u). Note that some entries of Tu as
well as some of the decoding matrices are have been not defined yet (e.g. L > Lλ may occur for some λ)), we
populate the undefined entries of Tu with zeros, and add zero matrices, and add arbitrary but consistently,
where decoding matrices are undefined.
To fit the above objects to the definition of a one-way secret-key distillation protocol, we consider each pub-
lic message as a tuple l = (λ,l). With the above definitions, D := (T ,D) is an (n,M,L) secret-key distillation
protocol with
1
n
logM ≥ R− δ (37)
by definition of M . It remains, to show that actually the bound on the performance µ stated is fulfilled.
We fix an arbitrary member
ρt =
∑
y∈Y
p(y) |y〉〈y| ⊗V (y)
from J. We first show that
Pr(Kt , K
′
t ) ≤ µ. (38)
holds. By construction, we have T(n,Y )\ ⊂Qcη , which together with well known type-bounds implies
pn

⋃
λ∈T(n,Y )\Tn
T nλ
 ≤ 2−ncη2
with a universal constant c > 0. It holds
Pr(Kt , K
′
t ) =
∑
yn∈Yn
pn(yn) ·Pr(Kt , K ′t |Y nt = yn)
≤
∑
λ∈Tn
∑
yn∈T nλ
pn(yn) ·Pr(Kt , K ′t |Y nt = yn) + 2−ncη
2
. (39)
We upper-bound for each λ ∈ Tn the corresponding summand on the r.h.s. of (39). For each yn ∈ T nλ , we
have
pn(yn) ·Pr(Kt , K ′t |Y nt = yn) =
M∑
m=1
∑
m′,m
pn(yn) ·Pr(Kt =m,K ′t =m′ |Y nt = yn)
=
M∑
m=1
∑
m′,m
L∑
l=1
pn(yn) ·Pr(Kt =m,K ′t =m′ ,Λt = (λ,l)|Y ns = yn)
=
M∑
m=1
∑
m′,m
Lλ∑
l=1
tr
(
Dλlm′V
⊗n
B (y
n)
)
· pn(yn) ·T (λ,l,m|yn)
=
M∑
m=1
∑
m′,m
Lλ∑
l=1
S∑
s,s′=1
tr
(
Dλlm′s′V
⊗n
B (y
n)
)
· pn(yn) ·Tu(λ,l,m,s|yn). (40)
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On the r.h.s. of (40), only the summands survive, where (λ,l,m,s) is in Aλ(y
n,u) by definition of Tu. For
the nonzero summands, we can estimate
Tu(λ,l,m,s|yn) = 1|Aλ(yn,u)| ≤ ((1− β3)Γλ)
−1 ≤ 2
( |T nλ |
Lλ ·M · Sλ
)
. (41)
The left of the above inequalities is because u ∈ A, the right holds, if n is large enough. We define the
abbreviation Aλ(y
n) := Aλ(y
n,u). Counting only the nonzero summands, and using the estimate in (41),
we yield
pn(yn) ·Pr(Kt , K ′t |Y nt = yn) ≤
∑
(l,m,s):
(λ,l,m,s)∈Aλ(yn)
∑
m′,m
S∑
s′=1
tr
(
D
(λ)
lm′s′V
⊗n
B (u
λ
lms)
) 2|T nλ | · pn(uλlms)
LλSλM
≤ 2
LλMλSλ
∑
(l,m,s):
(λ,l,m,s)∈Aλ(yn)
∑
m′,m
S∑
s′=1
tr
(
D
(λ)
lm′s′V
⊗n
B (u
λ
lms)
)
,
where in the last inequality, we noted, since uλlms is of type λ, |T nλ | · pn(uλlms) = pn(T nλ ) ≤ 1 holds. Since, for
each type λ ∈ Tn ⋃
yn∈T nλ
Aλ(y
n) = {λ} × [Lλ]× [M]× [Sλ]
holds by construction (see (25)), we have (with some rearrangements of terms)
∑
yn∈T nλ
pn(yn) ·Pr(Kt , K ′t |Y nt = yn) =
2
Lλ
Lλ∑
l=1
1
SλMλ
M∑
m=1
∑
m′,m
S∑
s,s′=1
tr
(
D
(λ)
lm′s′V
⊗n
B (u
λ
lms)
)
=
2
Lλ
Lλ∑
l=1
e(Cλ,l (uλ,l ),V ⊗nB )
≤ 2
Lλ
(Lλ · β3 + Lλ · 2β3) = 6β3. (42)
The last inequality holds, because we have chosen our protocol in a way that for at least a fraction of 1−2β3
of the codes are β3-good regarding the average error criterion (i.e. u is in A ⊂ C(3)λ (β3)).
Collecting inequalities, we arrive at
Pr(Kt , K
′
t ) ≤ (n+1)|Y | · 6β3 +2−ncη
2 ≤ 2− 16
√
ncˆ/8 (43)
for large enough n by (35). Next, we show that the key is almost equidistributed. For each λ ∈ T(n,Y ), we
consider the probability distribution PKt ,λ on [M], given by
PKt ,λ(m) :=
∑
yn∈T nλ
Pr(Kt =m|Y nt = yn)
|T nλ |
=
∑
yn∈T nλ
Lλ∑
l=1
Sλ∑
s=1
Tu (λ,l,m,s|yn)
|T nλ |
=
Lλ∑
l=1
Sλ∑
s=1
Tu (λ,l,m,s|uλlms )
|T nλ |
(44)
Using the properties of the protocol constructed together with (44), we arrive at
1
1+ β1
1
M
≤ PKt ,λ(m) ≤
1
1− β1
1
M
,
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for each λ ∈ Tn, from which we infer that
‖PK,λ −π[M]‖1 ≤ 2β1
is true for all λ ∈ Tn. We conclude
‖PKt −π[M]‖1 ≤
∑
λ∈Tn
pn(T nλ ) ‖PKt ,λ −π[M]‖1 ≤ 2β1 +2 · 2−ncη
2 ≤ 3β1,
where the last inequality holds if n is large enough. This implies
H(Kt) ≥ logM − 3β1 log M3β1 ≥ logM −
µ
2
if n is large enough. It remains to bound I(K ;En,Λ,ρΛKEn ,t). We will actually show that ρΛKEn ,t is close to
a state γt whith I(K ;E
n,Λ,γt ) = 0. Define
γt :=
∑
λ∈T(n,Y )
pn(T nλ ) |λ〉〈λ| ⊗ γt,λ
where we set for each λ ∈ T(n,Y )
γt,λ :=
1
Lλ ·M
Lλ∑
l=1
M∑
m=1
|l ⊗m〉〈l ⊗m| ⊗ σλ(V ).
We write ρΛKEn ,t in the form
ρΛKEn ,t =
∑
λ∈T(n,Y )
pn(T nλ ) |λ〉〈λ| ⊗ ρ˜t,λ,
where we defined
ρ˜t,λ :=
∑
yn∈T nλ
Lλ∑
l=1
M∑
m=1
Sλ∑
s=1
Tu (λ,l,m,s|yn)
|T nλ |
|l ⊗m〉〈l ⊗m| ⊗V⊗nE (yn).
We first consider λ ∈ Tn. Note that if (λ,l,m,s) is a member of Aλ(u,yn),
1
1+ β1
Γ−1λ ≤ Tu(λ,l,m,s|yn) ≤
1
1− β1 Γ
−1
λ ,
while being zero otherwise, which implies
∑
yn∈tnλ
Lλ∑
l=1
M∑
m=1
Sλ∑
s=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Tu(λ,l,m,s|yn)
|T nλ |
− 1
LλM |T nλ |Sλ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2β1.
Also, we know that for each l ∈ Lλ, s ∈ Sλ∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
Sλ
Sλ∑
s=1
V ⊗nE (y
n)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2β2.
We define
τ :=
∑
yn∈T nλ
Lλ∑
l=1
M∑
m=1
Sλ∑
s=1
1
Lλ ·M · Sλ · |T nλ |
|l ⊗m〉〈l ⊗m| ⊗V ⊗nE (yn),
and obtain
‖ρ˜t,λ −γt,λ‖1 ≤ ‖ρ˜t,λ − τ‖1 + ‖τ −γt,λ‖1
≤
∑
yn∈T nλ
Lλ∑
l=1
M∑
m=1
Sλ∑
s=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Tu(λ,l,m,s|yn)
|T nλ |
− 1
LλM |T nλ |Sλ
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
yn∈T nλ
V ⊗nE (y
n)−σλ(V )
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2(β1 + β2).
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Therefore,
‖ρKΛEn ,t −γt‖1 ≤
∑
λ∈T(n,Y )
pn(T nλ ) ‖ρ˜t,λ −γt,λ‖1
≤ 2(β1 + β2) + 2−ncη2
≤ µ
12
By using the well-known Alicki-Fannes bound for the quantum mutual information, we infer
I(K ;Λ,En ,ρKΛEn ,t) ≤ I(K ;Λ,En,γt ) + 12µ log(L ·dimK
⊗n
E ) + h
(
µ
12
)
≤ µ,
where the last inequality is by the fact that γt is an uncorrelated state, together with a large enough choice
of n, and h is the binary Shannon entropy.
Next, we prove an achievability result for the same simple kind of compound source as in the previous
proposition, but the lower bound on the key rate derived is including possible preprocessing of the source
outputs for the sender by stochastic matrices. For each set A of probability distributions on Y , we denote
its diameter (regarding the variational distance) by
diam(A) := sup{‖q − q′‖1 : q,q′ ∈ A}.
Proposition 14. Let P ⊂ P(Y ) be a set of probability distributions, diam(P ) ≤ ∆, V ⊂ CQ(Y ,KBE ), and U ,T
finite alphabets. Define
I :=
ρ(p,V ) :=
∑
y∈Y
p(y) |y〉〈y| ⊗V (y)

(p,V )∈P×V
.
For each PT |U : U → P(T ), PU |Y : Y → P(U ) stochastic matrices, and δ > 0, there is a number n0, such that for
each n > n0 we find an (n,M,L,µ)-secret-key distillation protocol for I which fulfills
µ ≤ 2− 16
√
nc2
1
n
logL ≤ sup
p∈P
inf
ρ∈Ip
S(U |BT , ρ˜) + log |T |
1
n
logM ≥ inf
p∈P
 infρ∈IpI(U ;B|T , ρ˜)− supρ∈IpI(U ;E|T , ρ˜)
− δ − 12∆ log |U | − 4h(∆), (45)
where h(x) = −x logx − (1 − x) log(1 − x), (x ∈ (0,1)) is the binary entropy, and c2 is a strictly positive constant.
We used the definition
ρ˜ :=
∑
t∈T
∑
u∈U
∑
y∈Y
PT |U (t|u)PU |Y (u|y)p(y) |u〉〈u| ⊗ |t〉〈t| ⊗V (y)
for each state
ρ =
∑
y∈Y
p(y) |y〉〈y| ⊗V (y) (p ∈ P ,V ∈ V ).
Proof. For the proof, we define a set of effective cqq density matrices Iˆ on which we apply Proposition 10
from which we derive existence of a certain forward secret-key distillation protocol for Iˆ. Afterwards, we
show that this protocol can be modified to a forward secret-key distillation protocol for I which has the
stated properties. Define, for each p ∈ P a probability distribution qp ∈ P(U ) by
qp(u) :=
∑
y∈Y
PU |Y (u|y)p(y) (u ∈ U ),
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a stochastic matrixWp : U → P(Y ) by
Wp(y|u) :=

p(y)PU |Y (u|y)
qp(u)
if qp(u) > 0
1
|Y | otherwise,
and a classical-quantum channel Vˆp : U → S (KBE ) by
Vˆp(u) :=
∑
y∈Y
Wp(u|y)V (y) (V ∈ V ).
Moreover, we define, introducing spaces KB′ = KE′ = C|T | a classical-quantum channel V˜ : U → S (KB′ ⊗
KE′ ) by
V˜ (u) :=
∑
t∈T
PT |U (t|u) |t〉〈t| ⊗ |t〉〈t| (u ∈ U ). (46)
Define for each (p,p′ ,V ) ∈ P ×P ×V a state
ρˆ(p,p′ ,V ) :=
∑
u∈U
qp(u) |u〉〈u| ⊗ Vˆp′ (u)⊗ V˜ (u).
We define a set of classical-quantum channels Vˆ := {Vˆp′ ⊗ V˜ : p′ ∈ P ,V ∈ V } and a set
Iˆ :=
{
ρ(p,p′ ,V ) : p,p
′ ∈ P ,V ∈ V
}
⊂ Scqq(C|U | ⊗KBE ⊗KB′E′ )
of cqq density matrices. Note that Iˆ meets the specifications of Proposition 10 (the states in Iˆ are parame-
terized by P ×Vˆ ). We apply Proposition 10 on Iˆ and infer in case of sufficiently large blocklength existence
of an (n,M,Lˆ,µ) secret-key distillation protocol Dˆ = (Tˆ , Dˆ) for Iˆ with a stochastic matrix
Tˆ : U → [M]× [Lˆ]
and
Dˆ :=
{
Dˆlm
}
(l,m)∈[Lˆ]×[M] ⊂ L(K
⊗n
BB′ )
being a POVM such that for the key rate, the lower bound
1
n
logM ≥ inf
p∈P
 inf
(p,p′ ,V )∈{p}×P×V
χ(qp , VˆB,p′ ⊗ V˜B′ )− sup
(p,p′ ,V )∈{p}×P×V
χ(qp , VˆE,p′ ⊗ V˜E′ )
− δ
≥ inf
(p,p′ ,V )∈P 2×V
χ(qp , VˆB,p′ ⊗ V˜B′ )− sup
(p,p′ ,V )∈P 2×V
χ(qp , VˆE,p′ ⊗ V˜E′ )− δ (47)
holds, and for each s := (p,p′ ,V ) the inequalities
Pr(Kˆs , Kˆ
′
s) ≤ µ, and
logM −H(Kˆs) + I(Kˆ ;EnE′nΛˆ, ρˆKˆΛˆEnE′n ,s) ≤ µ (48)
being satisfied with µ = 2− 16
√
nc2 with a constant c2 > 0. Notice that the cq-channel V˜B defined in (46) has
classical structure in the sense that all its output quantum states are diagonal in the orthogonal basis {t}.
Consequently, we can assume that for each l ∈ [Lˆ], m ∈ [M] the corresponding effect Dˆlm has the form
Dˆlm =
∑
tn∈T n
Dltnm ⊗ |tn〉〈tn| .
We define the POVM
D := {Dltnm}(l,tn,m)∈[Lˆ]×T n×[M]
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and the stochastic matrix T : Y → [Lˆ]× T n × [M] by
T (l, tn ,m|yn) :=
∑
u∈U n
PnT |U (t
n|un)Tˆ (l,m|un)PnU |Y (un |yn) ((l, tn ,m,yn) ∈ [L]× T n × [M]×Yn). (49)
With these definitions, D := (T ,D) is an (n,M,Lˆ · |T |n) secret-key distillation protocol for I. It holds for each
s := (p,V ) ∈ P ×V , m,m′ ∈ [M]
PKK ′ ,s(m,m
′) =
Lˆ∑
l=1
∑
tn∈T n
∑
yn∈Yn
pn(yn)T (l, tn,m|yn)tr(Dltnm′V ⊗nB (yn)) (50)
=
∑
un∈U n
Lˆ∑
l=1
∑
tn∈T n
∑
yn∈Yn
pn(yn)PnT |U (t
n|un)Tˆ (l,m|un)PnU |Y (un |yn)tr(Dltnm′V ⊗nB (yn)) (51)
=
∑
un∈U n
Lˆ∑
l=1
∑
tn∈T n
∑
yn∈Yn
qnp (u
n)W np (y
n |un)
× Tˆ (l,m|un) · tr((Dltnm′ )⊗ |tn〉〈tn|)(V ⊗nB (yn)⊗ V˜⊗nB′ (un))) (52)
=
∑
un∈U n
Lˆ∑
l=1
qnp (u
n)Tˆ (l,m|un)tr(Dˆlm(Vˆ ⊗np (un)⊗ V˜⊗nB′ (un))) (53)
= PKˆKˆ ′ ,(p,p,V )(m,m
′). (54)
The equality in (50) is holds by definition, (51) is valid by (49). The equality in (52) is justified by definition
of qp , Wp , and the fact that
tr(|t〉〈t| V˜B(u)) = PT |U (t|u) (t ∈ T ,u ∈ U )
holds by definition of V˜ . From (54), we directly infer
Pr(Ks , K
′
s) = Pr(Kˆ(p,p,V ) , Kˆ
′
(p,p,V )) ≤ µ, and (55)
H(Ks) =H(Kˆ(p,p′ ,V )) (56)
Notice that by definition of ρˆ(p,p,V ) is (up to unitaries) equal to ρ˜(p,V ), i.e.
ρˆ(p,p,V ) =
∑
u∈U
qp(u) |u〉〈u| ⊗ Vˆp(u)⊗ V˜ (u)
=
∑
t∈T
∑
u∈U
∑
y∈Y
PT |U (t|u)PU |Y (u|y)p(y) |u〉〈u| ⊗V (y)⊗ |t〉〈t| ⊗ |t〉〈t|
holds for each (p,V ) ∈ P ×V . Consequently, it follows
I(K ; ΛˆTE, ρ˜KΛˆTEn ,s) = I(Kˆ ;EE
nΛˆ, ρˆKˆΛˆEnE′n,(p,p,V )). (57)
The inequalities contained in (56) and (57) together with the one in (48) yield
logM −H(Ks) + I(K ; ΛˆTE, ρˆKΛˆTEn ,s) ≤ µ
for each s = (p,V ), which, together with (55) makes (T ,D) an (n, Lˆ · |T |n,M,µ) forward secret-key distillation
protocol for I. At last, we have to show thatM indeed satisfies the bound stated in (45). We will therefore,
lower-bound the right-hand side of (47). Because Markov-processing does never increase the variational
distance, it holds
‖qp − qp′ ‖1 ≤ ‖p − p′‖1 ≤ diam(P ) ≤ ∆ (58)
for each p,p′ ∈ P , where the rightmost inequality is by assumption. We obtain for each V ∈ V∣∣∣∣χ (qp , VˆB,p ⊗ V˜B)−χ (qp′ , VˆB,p ⊗ V˜B′ )
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 6‖qp − qp′‖1 log |U |+2h(‖qp − qp′‖1)
≤ 6∆ log |U |+2h(∆). (59)
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The first equality above is by application of Lemma 34 which can be found in Appendix B, the second by
(58). The bound in (59) directly implies
inf
(p′ ,V )
χ
(
qp, VˆB,p′ ⊗ V˜B′
)
≥ inf
V
χ
(
qp , VˆB,p ⊗ V˜B′
)
−∆ log |U | − 2h(∆)
= inf
ρ∈Ip
I(U,BB′ , ρˆ)−∆ log |U | − 2h(∆). (60)
for each p ∈ P . The equality in (60) holds by the identity
χ
(
qp , VˆB,p ⊗ V˜B′
)
= I(U,BB′ , ρˆ(p,p,V )).
By similar reasoning, we also yield the bound
sup
(p,p′ ,V )
χ
(
qp, VˆE,p′ ⊗ V˜E′
)
≤ sup
ρ∈Ip
I(U,EE′ , ρˆ) + 6∆ log |U |+2h(∆). (61)
Combination of (60) and (61) for each p ∈ P ensures us that
inf
(p,p′ ,V )∈P 2×V
χ(qp , VˆB,p′ ⊗ V˜B′ )− sup
(p,p′ ,V )∈P 2×V
χ(qp , VˆE,p′ ⊗ V˜E′ )
≥ inf
p∈P
 infρ∈Ip I(U,BB
′ , ρˆ)− sup
ρ∈Ip
I(U,EE′ , ρˆ)
− 12∆ log |U | − 4h(∆)
holds. Note that the identities
S(ρ˜BT ) = S(ρˆBB′ ), and S(ρ˜ET ) = S(ρˆEE′ ),
are valid. Moreover, for each ρ ∈ I the equalities
I(U ;B|T , ρ˜) =H(PUT ) + S(ρ˜BT )− S(ρ˜UBT )−H(PT ), and (62)
I(U ;E|T , ρ˜) =H(PUT ) + S(ρ˜ET )− S(ρ˜UET )−H(PT ), (63)
hold by definition, where PT , PTU are the distributions for the random variables T and TU . It is important,
to notice here that the distributions PU and PTU depend only on the Markov chain on the sender’s systems.
Therefore, we have for each p ∈ P
inf
ρ∈Ip
I(U ;B|T , ρ˜)− sup
ρ∈Ip
I(U ;E|T , ρ˜)
= inf
ρ∈Ip
(S(ρ˜BT )− S(ρ˜UBT ))− sup
ρ∈Ip
(S(ρ˜ET )− S(ρ˜UET ))
= inf
ρ∈Ip
(S(ρ˜BB′ )− S(ρ˜UBB′ ))− sup
ρ∈Ip
(S(ρ˜EE′ )− S(ρ˜UEE′ ))
= inf
ρ∈Ip
(
H(qp) + S(ρˆBB′ )− S(ρˆUBB′ )
)
− sup
ρ∈Ip
(
H(qp) + S(ρˆEE′ )− S(ρˆUEE′ )
)
= inf
ρ∈Ip
I(U ;BB′ , ρˆ)− sup
ρ∈Ip
I(U ;EE′ , ρˆ). (64)
Collecting the bounds obtained, we can prove the desired lower bound on the key rate. It holds
1
n
logM ≥ inf
(p,p′ ,V )∈P 2×V
χ(qp , VˆBp′ ⊗ V˜B′ )− sup
(p,p′ ,V )∈P 2×V
χ(qp , VˆE,p′ ⊗ V˜E′ )− δ
= inf
p∈P
 infρ∈IpI(U ;BB
′ , ρˆ)− sup
ρ∈Ip
I(U ;EE′ , ρˆ)
− δ − 12∆ log |U | − 4h(∆)
= inf
p∈P
 infρ∈IpI(U ;B|T , ρ˜)− supρ∈Ip I(U ;E|T , ρ˜)
− δ− 12∆ log |U | − 4h(∆).
The first inequality above is by (47), the first inequality is the one from (60), while the last inequality is by
(64). We are done.
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Proposition 15. Let ∆ > 0, and J ⊂ Scqq(Y ,KBE ) be a ∆-regular set of cqq density matrices on HABE . For all
z,z′ ∈N, it holds
K→(J) ≥ K˜ (1)→ (J, z,z)− δ − freg (z,∆),
with a function freg : N ×R+ → R+ such that f (r,∆)→ 0 (∆→ 0). For a set A := {
∑
y∈Y p(y) |y〉〈y| ⊗ σy} on
some space, and z,z′ ∈N, the function K˜ (1)→ (A, z,z′) is defined
K˜
(1)
→ (A) := inf
p∈PA
sup
Γ:=T←U←Yp
 infσ∈ApI(U ;B|T ,σΓ)− supσ∈ApI(U ;E|T ,σΓ)
 .
The supremum above is over all Markov chains T ← U ← Yp resulting from application of Markov transition
matrices PT |U : U → T , PU |Y : Y →U on p for each p ∈ p with |U | = z, |T | = z′, and
σTU :=
∑
y∈Y
∑
t∈T
∑
u∈U
PT |U (t|u)PU |Y (u|y)p(y) |t〉〈t| ⊗ |u〉〈u| ⊗ σy
for given transition matrices PT |U , PU |Y and
σ =
∑
y∈Y
p(y) |y〉〈y| ⊗ σy . (65)
Proof. Assume the set J is parameterized such that P ⊂ P(Y ) is the set of possible marginal distributions
on the sender’s system, while to each p ∈ P a set Vp ⊂ CQ(Y ,KBE ) is associated, i.e.
J =
ρ :=
∑
y∈Y
q(y) |y〉〈y| ⊗V (y) : q ∈ P ,V ∈ Vq

Let δ > 0, z,z′ ∈N be arbitrary but fixed numbers. We show that
K˜ (1)(J, z,z′)− δ − freg (z,∆)
with freg (z,∆) being defined
freg (z,∆) := 32∆ log(z ·dimKBE ) + 24h(∆)
is an achievable forward secret-key distillation rate for J. Note that the function defined above indeed has
the properties claimed above. The strategy of proof will be as follows. We will equip P with a regular
non-intersecting covering, were we utilize the set of types for large enough blocklength to define such.
With the right choice of parameters, we obtain a finite family of sources which approximate J and have
the addition property for fulfilling the hypotheses of Proposition 14. Combining the protocols obtained
for each member of the family with an estimation protocol on the first
√
n letters for blocklength n leads
us to a universal protocol for I.
We begin setting up the covering of P . Define for each k, l ∈N, λ ∈ T(k,Y ) a set
Tλ,l :=
{
q ∈ P(Y ) : ∀y ∈ Y : λ(y)− l2k < q(y) ≤ λ(y) + l2k
}
.
Notice that the diameter of Tλ,l is bounded by
diam(Tλ,l ) ≤ l · |Y |k ,
and the sets in the family being pairwise non-intersecting for l = 1. We fix k to be specified later, define
Pλ := Tλ,3 ∩ P for each λ ∈ T(k,Y ), and denote by Tˆ the collection of all λ with Pλ being nonempty. We
construct sets of cqq density matrices, which fit the specifications demanded in Proposition 14, we define
Vˆλ :=
⋃
q∈Pλ
Vq, and Jˆp,λ :=

∑
y∈Y
p(y) |y〉〈y| ⊗V (y)

V∈V˜λ
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for each λ ∈ Tˆ. Fix the number k large enough, to ensure us that for each λ ∈ T˜, p,p′ are in Pλ implies
dH (J
AB
p ,J
AB
p′ ) + dH (J
AE
p ,J
AE
p′ ) ≤ ∆,
and, in addition diam(Pλ) ≤ ∆. Notice that this choice of k is indeed possible because we assumed J to be
∆-regular. We consider the family {Jˆλ}λ∈Tˆ, where for each λ, Jˆλ is the set of density matrices defined by
Jˆλ :=
⋃
p∈Pλ
Jp,λ =

∑
y∈Y
p(y) |y〉 〈y| ⊗V (y) : p ∈ Pλ,V ∈ Vˆλ
 .
The rightmost of the above equalities holds by construction. Notice that since Pλ has diameter bounded,
and Jλ is parameterized by the full Cartesian product Pλ × Vˆλ, Proposition 14 can be applied in each case.
Choose for each λ ∈ Tˆ, stochastic matrices PT |U,λ : U → P(T ) and PU |Y,λ : Y → P(U ) such that
inf
ρ∈Jp
I(Uλ;B|Tλ, ρ˜)− sup
ρ∈Jp
I(Uλ;E|Tλ, ρ˜) ≥ sup
T←U←Y
 infρ∈JpI(U ;B|T , ρ˜)− supρ∈JpI(U ;E|T , ρ˜)
− δ2 (66)
is fulfilled. Resulting from the choices made, it also holds
inf
ρ∈Jˆp,λ
I(Uλ;B|Tλ, ρ˜)− sup
ρ∈Jˆp,λ
I(Uλ;E|Tλ, ρ˜)
≥ inf
ρ∈Jp
I(Uλ;B|Tλ, ρ˜)− sup
ρ∈Jp
I(Uλ;E|Tλ, ρ˜)− freg (∆, z,z′ ) (67)
for each λ ∈ T˜,p ∈ Pλ. The inequality above is by continuity together with properties of our construction
and definition of freg . The full argument for justification can be found in Appendix C. Combining the
above estimates, we have for each λ ∈ Tˆ
inf
p∈Pλ
 infρ∈Jp,λI(Uλ;B|Tλ, ρ˜)− supρ∈Jp,λI(Uλ;E|Tλ, ρ˜)

≥ inf
p∈Pλ
 infρ∈JpI(Uλ;B|Tλ, ρ˜)− supρ∈JpI(Uλ;E|Tλ , ρ˜)
− freg (∆, z,z′ )
≥ inf
p∈Pλ
sup
T←U←Y
 infρ∈JpI(U ;B|T , ρ˜)− supρ∈JpI(U ;E|T , ρ˜)
− δ2 −
1
2
freg (∆, z,z
′ )
≥ inf
p∈P
sup
T←U←Y
 infρ∈JpI(U ;B|T , ρ˜)− supρ∈JpI(U ;E|T , ρ˜)
− δ2 −
1
2
freg (∆, z,z
′ )
= K˜
(1)
→ (J, z,z′ )− δ
2
− 1
2
freg (∆, z,z
′ ). (68)
fulfilled. The first inequality above holds by (67), the second is by (66). Let the blocklength n ∈N be fixed.
We set n = an + bn with an := ⌈
√
n⌉, bn := n− an, and consider the decomposition
Yn = Y an ×Y bn .
Applying Proposition 14, to each of the sets Jˆλ, we infer for each large enough n, λ ∈ Tˆ existence of an
(bn,M,L, ϑˆ) secret-key distillation protocol (Tˆλ , Dˆλ) for Jˆλ with
ϑˆ ≤ 2− 16
√
bncλ ≤ 2 16
√
bnc
with a strictly positive constant cλ and c := min
λ∈T˜
cλ and
M =
⌊
exp
(
bn
(
K˜
(1)
→ (J)− 3δ
4
− freg (∆, z,z′ )
))⌋
. (69)
24
Note that the combination of M and θ is indeed possible. This is justified by combining the claim of
Proposition 14 and the bound in (68). Next, we define a two-phase protocol, where the first an letters from
the source observed by the sender are used to estimate λ ∈ ˆf T , while the protocol (Dˆλ, Tˆλ) for the estimated
parameter λ is applied on the remaining bn outputs of the source. Tor formalize this strategy, we define a
stochastic matrix
T : Yn → P([L]×T(k,Y )× [M])
with entries
T (l,θ,m|yn) := Tˆθ(l,m|ybn ) δθξ(yan ) (l,m,θ,yn) ∈ [L]× [M]× Tˆ×Yn)
for each µ ∈ Tˆ, were we defined a function ξ : Y an → T(k,Y ) which maps each yan to the unique member
λ = ξ(yan ) such that Tλ,1 contains the type of y
an . Notice, that some of the entries are undefined, if Tˆ does
not contain all elements of T(k,Y ). In this case, entries can be defined in any consistent way, because they
will be of no further relevance. Moreover, we introduce matrices
Dlmθ := 1
⊗an
HB ⊗D
θ
lm ∈ L(H⊗nB ),
where Dθlm is the corresponding effect from the POVMDθ associated to θ. With these definitions, it is clear
that (T ,D) is an (n,M,L · |Tˆ|,ϑ) forward secret-key distillation protocol for J, with a number ϑ which we
lower-bound. Let
ρ :=
∑
y∈Y
p(y) |y〉〈y| ⊗V (y)
be any fixed member of J, and λ0 the unique type in Tˆ such that p ∈ Tλ0 ,1. It is important to notice that
not only for λ0, but also for each θ ∈ Tˆ with θ ∈ Tλ0 ,3, ρ is also a member of Jˆθ . Assuming application of
the protocol to ρ, we suppress indicating the chosen member in the following formulas. By definition, it
holds
PKK ′ΛΘ|Yn (m,m′ , l,θ|yn) = Tˆθ(m,l |ybn ) · δθ,ξ(yan ) · tr(Dθlm′V ⊗bn (ybn ))
= Pθ
KˆKˆ ′Λˆ|Y bn (m,m
′ , l,θ|ybn ) · δθ,ξ(yan ),
with Pθ
KˆKˆ ′Λˆ|Y bn (m,m
′ , l,θ|ybn ) being the conditional distribution generated by (Tˆθ , Dˆθ). We define the sets
ι1 := {yan : ξ(yan ) ∈ Tλ,1}, and ι3 := {yan : ξ(yan ) ∈ Tλ,3}. (λ ∈ T(k,Y ))
It holds
PKK ′ (m,m
′) =
∑
θ∈T(k,Y )
∑
yn∈Yn
L∑
l=1
PKK ′ΛΘ|Yn(m,m′ , l,θ|yn)pn(yn)
=
∑
θ∈T(k,Y )
∑
yan∈Tθ,1
pan(yan )
∑
ybn∈Y bn
L∑
l=1
Pθ
KˆKˆ ′Λˆ|Y bn (m,m
′ , l |ybn )pbn(ybn )
=
∑
θ∈T(k,Y )
pan(ι1,θ ) P
θ
KK ′ (m,m
′)
for each m,m′ ∈ [M]. We denote the key random variables produced by performing (Tˆθ , Dˆθ) on ρ⊗bn by Kˆθ
and Kˆ ′θ . We directly obtain
Pr(K , K ′) =
∑
θ∈T(k,Y )
pan(ιθ,1) ·Pr(Kˆθ , Kˆ ′θ)
≤ pan(ιλ0 ,3) · ϑˆ + pan(ιcλ0 ,3)
≤ 2 16
√
bnc +2
−an ck2
≤ 2ϑˆ (70)
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The first inequality above is by the fact that the protocol associated to each θ ∈ Tˆ∩Tλ0 ,3 is ϑˆ-good for ρ
by construction. The second inequality is by standard type bounds. Explicitly, we have by construction
yan ∈ ιcλ0 ,3 implying ∣∣∣∣∣ 1anN (e|y
an )− p(e)
∣∣∣∣∣ > 1k
for all e ∈ Y , where N (e|yan ) is the number of occurrences of the letter e in yan . Consequently
pan(ιcλ0 ,3) ≤ pan
((
T
an
p, 1k
)c)
≤ 2−an ck2 ≤ ϑˆ, (71)
where c is a universal, strictly positive constant, and the last inequality holds for large enough choice of n.
Also, it holds
H(K)− I(K ;ΛΘEn ,ρKΛΘEn ) =H(K)− I(K ;Θ)− I(K ;ΛEn |Θ,ρKΛΘEn )
=H(K |Θ)− I(K ;ΛEn |Θ,ρKΛΘEn )
=
∑
θ∈T
pan(ιθ,1) (H(K |Θ = θ)− I(K ;ΛEn |Θ = θ,ρKΛΘEn ))
=
∑
θ∈T
pan(ιθ,1)
(
H(Kˆθ)− I(Kˆθ ;ΛEbn ,ρθ
KˆΛˆEbn
)
)
, (72)
where the first equality is the chain rule for the quantum mutual information applied, the second holds
by definition of the classical mutual information. The third equality results from the fact that if θ is the
estimate obtained in the first an outputs of the source, (Tˆθ , Dˆθ ) is performed on the remaining bn outputs,
which determines the conditional quantities as generated from application of the protocol. Therefore, we
obtain
logM −H(K) + I(K ;ΛΘEn,ρKΛΘEn )
=
∑
θ∈T
pan(ιθ,1)
(
logM −H(Kˆθ) + I(Kˆθ ; ΛˆθEbn ,ρθ
KˆΛˆEbn
)
)
≤ pan(ιλ0 ,3) · ϑˆ+ pan(ιλ0 ,3) · (2 · logM + logL+ bn · logdimKBE )
≤ 2ϑˆ (73)
where the equality above follows from (72), the first inequality is by the fact that the protocol (Tˆθ , Dˆθ) is
ϑˆ-good for ρ whenever θ is a direct grid point neighbour of λ0, i.e. Tθ,1 ⊂ Tλ0 ,3. Moreover we applied
the ultimate bound I(A;B,ρ) ≤ 2logdimHA ⊗HB which holds for each state σ on any Hilbert space HA ⊗
HB. The last inequality holds with a large enough choice of n by application of the bound in (71). The
bounds obtained in (73) and (70 show us that (T ,D) is actually an (n,M,L,ϑ) forward secret-key distillation
protocol for J, with ϑ ≤ 2ϑˆ, and, since bn/n→ 1 for n→∞, it holds
1
n
logM ≥ bn
n
K˜
(1)
→ (J)− 3δ
4
− freg (∆, z,z′ )
≥ K˜ (1)→ (J)− δ − freg (∆, z,z′ )
if n is large enough, where the first inequality is from (69).
To prove achievability of the multi-letter formula claimed in Theorem 8, we have to ensure ourselves
that regularity conditions do not break down when considering the set I⊗n := {ρ⊗n : ρ ∈ I} instead of a set
I of cqq density matrices. The following two basic lemmas will turn out to be sufficient for our needs.
Lemma 16. Let I,J ⊂ L(K) be any two sets of density matrices. It holds for each n ∈N
dH (I
⊗n,J⊗n) ≤ n · dH (I,J),
where dH is the Hausdorff distance induced by the trace norm on the underlying space.
Proof. The inequality
‖a⊗n − b⊗n‖1 ≤ n · ‖a− b‖1
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valid for any two matrices a,b ∈ L(K) inherits to the Hausdorff distance. It holds
sup
a∈I
inf
b∈J
‖a⊗n − b⊗n‖1 ≤ n · sup
a∈I
inf
b∈J
‖a− b‖1.
Lemma 17. Let I be a set of cqq density matrices. It holds
I ǫ − regular ⇒ I⊗k k · ǫ − regular.
for each k ∈N.
Proof. Is by direct application of Lemma 16 and the definition of regularity.
We now obtained sufficient preparations to tackle the proof of achievability in Theorem 8. Before we
head to the proof, we ensure ourselves that the limit in (11) indeed exists.
Lemma 18. Let I be a set of cqq density matrices on HABE . It holds
sup
k∈N
1
k
K (1)(I⊗k ) = lim
k→∞
1
k
K (1)(I⊗k ).
Proof. The assertion of the lemma follows from application of Fekete’s lemma [19] on the sequence
K (1)(I⊗k ). We check that the hypotheses of Fekete’s lemma are fulfilled. Clearly, the sequence is bounded.
We show that it is also superadditive, i.e. K (1)(I⊗(k+l)) ≥ K (1)(I⊗k ) +K (1)(I⊗l ) being valid for all k, l ∈N. We
can for each k write K (1)(I⊗k ) in the form
K (1)(I⊗k ) = inf
p∈PI
sup
z,z′∈N
Kˆ (1)(I⊗k ,p,z,z′)
were we defined
Kˆ (1)(I⊗k ,p,z,z′ ) := sup
T←U←Xp
 infσ∈IpI(U ;B|T ,σ˜)− supσ∈IpI(U ;E|T ,σ˜ )
 ,
with the outer maximization above being over all Markov chains generated by transition matrices PU |X :
X → P(X ) and PT |U : U → P(T ) with alphabets of cardinalities |U | = z, |T | = z′ , and
σ˜ :=
∑
t∈T
∑
u∈U
∑
x∈X
PT |U (t|u) PU |X(u|x) p(x) |u〉〈u| |t〉〈t| ⊗V (x)
for
σ =
∑
x∈X
p(x) |x〉〈x| ⊗V (x).
Notice that for each p ∈ PI, z,z′ ∈N
Kˆ (1)(I⊗(k+l),p,z,z′ ) ≥ Kˆ (1)(I⊗k ,p,z,z′) + Kˆ (1)(I⊗l ,p,z,z′),
and moreover, for each z1 ≤ z2, z′1 ≤ z′2,
Kˆ (1)(I⊗k ,p,z2, z′2) ≥ Kˆ (1)(I⊗k ,p,z1, z′1)
holds for each k ∈N, p ∈ PI. We obtain
Kˆ (1)(I⊗(k+l),p,z2, z′2) ≥ Kˆ (1)(I⊗k ,p,z2, z′2) + Kˆ (1)(I⊗l ,p,z2, z′2)
≥ Kˆ (1)(I⊗k ,p,z2, z′2) + Kˆ (1)(I⊗l ,p,z1, z′1)
Consequently, it holds
sup
z,z′∈N
Kˆ (1)(I⊗(k+l),p,z,z′ ) ≥ sup
z,z′∈N
Kˆ (1)(I⊗k ,p,z,z′ ) + sup
z,z′∈N
Kˆ (1)(I⊗l ,p,z,z′)
for each p ∈ PI. We conclude
K (1)(I⊗(k+l)) ≥ K (1)(I⊗k ) +K (1)(I⊗l )
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Proof of Theorem 8. We first prove achievability, i.e. validity of the inequality
K→(I) ≥ lim
k→∞
1
k
K
(1)
→ (I⊗k )
Let z.z′ ,k ∈N and δ > 0 be arbitrary and fixed. We show that
1
k
K˜
(1)
→ (I⊗k)− δ
is an achievable forward secret-key distillation rate. We apply Proposition 15 with J = I⊗k , and conclude
that for each large enough blocklength g ∈N, we find an (l,M,L,ϑ) forward secret-key distillation protocol
for I⊗k with ϑ ≤ 2− 16√gc3 with a constant c3 > 0, and
1
g
logM ≥ K˜ (1)(I⊗k , z,z′)− 2
3
δ (74)
where we chose ∆ small enough to satisfy freg (z,z
′ ,∆) ≤ δ3 . Since an (g,K,M,ϑ) protocol for I⊗k is obviously
an (g · k,M,L,ϑ) protocol for I, we obtained sufficient protocols for all large enough blocklengths being
integer multiples of k. We can achieve sufficient protocols also for the remaining blocklengths just by
wasting resources. To be explicit, let n = k · g + r with 0 < r < k and assume (Tˆgk , Dˆgk) being an (g · k,M,L,µ)
protocol for I. Define a protocol (Tn,Dn) for blocklength n by setting
Tn(l,m|xn) = Tˆgk(l,m|(x1, . . . ,xg ·k)) (xn = (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ X n)
and effects
Dn,lm := Dˆgk,lm ⊗1⊗kHB
for each l ∈ [L],m ∈ [M]. It is clear that (Tn,Dn) is an (n,M,L,µ) forward secret-key distillation protocol for
I with rate
1
n
logM =
1
g · k + r logM ≥
1
g · k logM −
δ
3
(75)
if n is large enough. It follows from (74) and (75) that we actually achieve
1
k
K˜ (1)(I⊗k , z,z′ )− δ
Since δ, z,z′ were arbitrary, we are done. We do not give a detailed argument for the converse inequality
here, since the assertion directly follows from (13) together with a converse proof for the case of a source
with SMI given in the next section.
V. SECRET-KEY DISTILLATION WITH SENDERMARGINAL INFORMATION (SMI)
In this section, we assume that the sender has perfect knowledge of his/her marginal distribution de-
riving from the source statistics. We will prove the achievability part of Theorem 9 by decomposing each
compound cqq source into a finite collection of regular compound cqq sources. To obtain such an approx-
imation, we need the following basic assertion. For a given set X, we use the notation 2X for the power
set.
Lemma 19. Let dH be the Hausdorff distance on 2
R
n
generated by the 1-norm distance on Rn. Let A ⊂Rn be a
subset of Rn with diam(A) ≤ a <∞. For each ∆ > 0, there exists a family RA := {A˜ω}Ωω=1 ⊂ 2R
n \ {∅} with the
following properties.
1. Ω ≤ exp
((
n·a
∆
)n)
.
2. For each B ⊂ A there exists ω ∈ [Ω], such that
dH (B,A˜ω) ≤ ∆, and B ⊂ A˜k .
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Proof. Equip Rn with the regular pairwise-disjoint covering, generated by the n-dimensional half-open
cubes [(
k1
∆
n
, . . . ,kn
∆
n
)
,
(
(k1 +1)
∆
n
, . . . , (kn +1)
∆
n
))
((k1, . . . ,kn) ∈ Zn).
Since diam(A) ≤ a is assumed, we do not need more than K :=
(
n·a
∆
)n
of these cubes to cover A. Let {Gk}Kk=1
be any parameterization of the family of cubes intersecting with A by [K] := {1, . . . K}. Define, for each
ω ⊂ [K]
A˜ω :=
⋃
k∈ω
Gk .
We show that
RA := {A˜ω}Ωω=1
indeed has the properties stated in the lemma. The first property is fulfilled by the bound on K and the
fact that there are not more, than 2K different values for ω. The member
ω := {k ∈ [K] : Gk ∩A , ∅} (76)
fulfills the properties demanded for the second property.
Proof of Theorem 9. For proving achievability, the following strategy is applied. We approximate I by a
finite family {Iω}ω∈Ω and apply Theorem 8 for each degree of regularity. Let I := {ρs}s∈S be a parame-
terization of I, and {ρA,t}t∈T be a parameterization of the set of marginal states on HA which derive from
members of I. Fix an arbitrary ∆ > 0 and let {A˜ω}ω∈Ω be an approximation of I with the properties stated
in Lemma 19 with parameter λ. Note that by identifying C to R2 in the usual way, the approximation
satisfies
|Ω| ≤ exp

4dimH
2
ABE
∆

4dimH2ABE
 <∞,
where we only use the fact, the cardinality of Ω is finite. Let, for each t ∈ T , ω(t) the element of Ω as
defined in (76) for It . It holds
It ⊂ A˜ω, and dH (A˜ω,It ) ≤ ∆. (77)
Define
I˜α :=
⋃
t: ω(t)=α
It (α ∈Ω).
The family {I˜α}α∈Ω is decomposition of I into a family of pairwise disjoint sets of cqq density matrices
with the additional feature that for each α ∈ Ω, I˜α is 4∆-regular, which can be justified as follows. For
each t, t′ with ω(t) =ω(t′) := β, it holds
dH (It ,It′ ) ≤ dH (It , A˜β) + dH (A˜β ,It′ ) ≤ 2∆. (78)
The left of the above inequalities is the triangle inequality for the Hausdorff distance applied, the right
hand inequality is by (77). Therefore, we infer, using monotonicity of the Hausdorff distance under taking
partial traces,
dH (I
AB
t ,I
AB
t′ ) + dH (I
AE
t ,I
AE
t′ ) ≤ 2 · dH (It ,It′ ) ≤ 4∆.
From applying Proposition 15 on each of the sets I˜β , t ∈ T , we know that for each given δ,µ > 0, there is a
number k0(β), such that we find for each n > k0(β) an (n,Mβ ,Lβ ,µβ ) forward secret-key distillation protocol
(T (β),D(β)) for I˜β , with
logMβ ≥ K˜ (1)(Iβ , z,z′)− freg,β (z,∆)− δ
≥ K˜ (1)(I, z,z′ )− freg,β (z,∆)− δ (79)
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for each z,z′ ∈N with a function freg,β as stated in Proposition 15. Moreover, we have bounds
µβ ≤ 2−
16√ncβ , and Lβ ≤ 2nRc,β
with constants cβ > 0 and Rc,β ∈ R+ for each β > 0. We define c := minβ∈Ω , and cβ , Rc := minβ∈ΩRc,β ,
L = 2nRc ,M := minβ∈Ω . If we define a stochastic matrix Tt with entries
Tt(β, l,m|xn) := T (β)(l,m|xn) · δβω(t) (β ∈Ω, l ∈ [L],m ∈ [)
and effects
Dβlm :=D
(β)
lm (β ∈Ω, l ∈ [L],m ∈ [M]),
Then ((Tt ,D))t∈T with D := {Dβlm}(β,l,m)∈Ω×[L]×[M] is an (n,M, |Ω| · L,µ) secret-key distillation protocol for I
with SMI, such that
logM ≥ K˜ (1)(I, z,z′ )− freg,β (z,∆)− δ
holds by (79). Since ∆ > 0 was arbitrary,
K˜ (1)(I, z,z′ )− 2δ
is achievable for each z,z′ ∈N. Consequently, it holds
K→,SMI ≥ sup
z,z′∈N
K˜ (1)(I, z,z′ )− 2δ = K˜ (1)(I)− 2δ
The same reasoning can be applied for I⊗k , k ∈N, which implies that
1
k
K (1)(I⊗k )
is achievable as well. It remains to prove the converse inequality. Assume P ⊂ P(X ) to be the set of
marginal probability distributions on the sender’s systems deriving from I. Define Vp ⊂ CQ(X ,HBE ) to be
the set of classical-quantum channels associated to each p ∈ P . I.e. Fix k ∈N, and assume (T ,Dp)p∈P to be
an (k,M,L,µ) forward secret-key distillation protocol for the set
Ip :=
ρp,V :=
∑
x∈X
p(x) |x〉〈x| ⊗V (x) : V ∈ Vp

of density matrices from I having sender marginal distribution p. Fix any p ∈ P we suppress the index p
for the next lines. Denote by
ρΛKK ′En ,V
the state resulting from performing (Tp ,D) on ρV according to (7) for each V ∈ Vp. Note that the resulting
pair (Λ,K) of random variables does not depend on the chosen state ρV since all state in Ip have same
sender marginal distribution. Since logM −H(K) and I(K ;ΛEn,ρΛKEn ,V ) are nonnegative by definition of
the protocol and non-negativity of the quantum mutual information, the inequalities
logM −H(K) ≤ µ, and sup
V∈V
I(K ;ΛEn ,ρΛKEn ,V ) ≤ µ (80)
are simultaneously fulfilled. Moreover, we have
H(K) = I(K ;K ′V ) +H(K |K ′V )
≤ I(K ;K ′V ) +µ logM + h(µ)
≤ I(K ;K ′VΛ) +µ logM + h(µ)
≤ I(K ;BnΛ,ρKΛBn ,V ) +µ logM + h(µ), (81)
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where the first inequality is by Fano’s inequality together with the assumption Pr(K , K ′V ) ≤ µ, while the
last two inequalities follow from the data processing inequalities for the classical and quantum mutual
information. We infer
logM ≤H(K) +µ
≤ inf
V∈V
I(K ;BnΛ,ρKΛBn ,V ) +µ+µ logM + h(µ)
≤ inf
V∈V
I(K ;BnΛ,ρKΛBn ,V )− sup
V∈V
I(K ;EnΛ,ρKΛEn ,V ) + 2µ+µ logM + h(µ)
≤ inf
V∈V
I(K ;Bn|Λ,ρKΛBn ,V )− sup
V∈V
I(K ;En |Λ,ρKΛEn ,V ) + 2µ+µ logM + h(µ)
≤ K (1)(I⊗kp ) + 2µ+µ logM + h(µ). (82)
The first and the third of the above inequalities are from (80), while the second is from (81). The fourth is
by definition of the quantum mutual information together with the fact that the distribution (K ;Λ) does
not depend on the chosen V . The last one results from observing that X → (Λ,K)→ Λ is a Markov chain.
The estimate in (82) is valid for each p ∈ P . Minimization over all p ∈ P leads to
logM ≤ inf
p∈P
K (1)(I⊗kp ) + 2µ+µ logM + h(µ)
= K (1)(I⊗k ) + 2µ+µ logM + h(µ),
where the equality above is by definition of the function K
(1)
→ .
VI. DISCUSSION OF REGULARITY OF COMPOUND CQQ SOURCES
This section is of twofold purpose. First, we point out that regularity issues have operational significance
for forward secret-key distillation from tripartite compound sources. While for regular sources, there is no
gap between the forward secret-key key distillation capacities with and without SMI, there may be serious
differences in capacities, if the source is not regular. Second, we introduce a weaker notion of regularity
than the one introduced in Definition 6, where we utilize notions from the theory of set-valued functions.
A. Operational significance of regularity conditions
We have seen in the previous section that there is no difference between the forward secret-key distilla-
tion capacities with and without SMI, as long as the source is regular in the sense of Definition 6. We admit
that there may be weaker notions of regularity which also exhibit this property (an example of such a con-
dition is introduced in the next section). Regularity conditions seem somewhat technical on a first view.
One can easily imagine large classes of sets of cqq density matrices, which are notoriously easy to process
even in the case without sender knowledge, while being irregular. This feature is shared in a trivial way
by all irregular sources having zero forward secret-key distillation capacity under sender knowledge. The
following example depicts the fact that also in nontrivial cases irregularities may be of no consequences
for the behaviour of the source regarding forward secret-key distillation.
Example 20. Define for a finite alphabet X , A := {p ∈ P(X ) : ∀x ∈ X : p(x) ∈Q}, V ∈ CQ(X ,HB ⊗HE ), and let
KB =C2 be the Hilbert space of an additional system assigned to the legitimate receiver. Define states
ρa :=
∑
x∈X
a(x) |x〉〈x| ⊗VBE(x)⊗ |ea〉〈ea|
with {e1, e2} being an orthonormal basis in KB, ea := e1 if a ∈ A and ea = e2 if a ∈ Ac. The source defined by
I := {ρa}a∈P(X ) is not regular, but can be easily converted to a regular one by just discarding the systems on KB.
Beside the mentioned facts, the question of regularity in principle, bears strong operational significance.
The next theorem shows that for irregular sources, the capacities with and without sender marginal state
knowledge may be substantially different.
Theorem 21. The equality
K→,SMI (I) = K→(I)
does not hold in general.
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Proof. We construct an example of a set I with
K→,SMI (I) = 1 and K→(I) = 0. (83)
Let X = Y = {0,1}, and HB = HE = C2 ⊗C2. We introduce classical-quantum channels W1,W2 : {0,1} →
S (C2 ⊗C2) by
W1(x,y) =W1(x) := |x〉〈x| ⊗Π,
W2(x,y) =W2(y) :=Π ⊗ |y〉〈y| ((x,y) ∈ X ×Y ),
where Π := 12 is the flat state on C
2. We set
V1,B = V2,E =W1, V2,B = V1,E =W2,
and define states
ρp :=

∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y 14 |x⊗ y〉〈x⊗ y| ⊗V1,B(x)⊗V1,E(y) if p = π∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y 12p(y) |x⊗ y〉〈x⊗ y| ⊗V2,B(y)⊗V2,E(x) otherwise,
where π denotes the equidistribution on {0,1}, i.e. p(0) = p(1) = 12 . Consider the set I := {ρp : p ∈ P(Y )}. We
first show the left equality in (83). If we define stochastic matrices P
(1)
U |XY , P
(2)
U |XY : X ×Y → U := {0,1} with
entries
P
(1)
U |XY (u|x,y) := δxu , and P
(2)
U |XY (u|x,y) := δyu (x ∈ X ,y ∈ Y ,u ∈ U ),
and use the sender’s preprocessings P
(1)
U |XY for ρπ and P
(2)
U |XY for each p , π, we achieve the maximum in the
capacity formula derived in Theorem 9. The corresponding states are
ρˆπ :=
∑
u∈U
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
P
(1)
U |XY (u|x,y)
1
4
|u〉〈u| ⊗V1,B(x)⊗V1,E(y)
=
∑
u∈U
1
2
|u〉〈u| ⊗ |u〉〈u| ⊗Π ⊗Π ⊗Π
ρˆp :=
∑
u∈U
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
P
(2)
U |XY (u|x,y)p(x)
1
2
|u〉〈u| ⊗V2,B(y)⊗V2,E(x)
=
∑
u∈U
1
2
|u〉〈u| ⊗Π ⊗ |u〉〈u| ⊗ σp,E (p ∈ P(Y ) \ {π}),
where σp,E :=
∑
x∈X p(x)V2,E(x). Note that both of the above states contain perfect common randomness
between the legitimate users without sharing any correlations to the eavesdropper, which is the optimum
they can achieve, as is easily observed. It therefore holds
K→,SMI (I) = log2 = 1.
The situation is completely different, if no SMI is present. Let µ > 0 be fixed and (T ,D) an arbitrary
(n,M,L,µ) forward secret-key distillation protocol for I without SMI. I.e. the inequalities
Pr(Kp , K
′
p) ≤ µ (84)
and
logM −H(Kp) + I(K,ΛEn ,ρKΛEn ,p) ≤ µ (85)
are satisfied for each p ∈ P(Y ). If we define the states
ρ˜p :=
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x)
1
2
|x⊗ y〉〈x⊗ y| ⊗V1,B(x)⊗V2,E(x) (p ∈ P(Y ) \ {π}),
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the identity
I(K ;ΛEn,ρKΛEn ,p) = I(K ;ΛB
n, ρ˜KΛBn ,p) (86)
is fulfilled by symmetry. Moreover, it holds
∥∥∥ρKΛBn ,π − ρ˜KΛBn ,p∥∥∥1 ≤ ‖trH⊗nE ρ⊗nπ − trH⊗nE ρ˜⊗np ‖1 = ‖pn −πn‖1 ≤ n‖p −π‖1 (87)
where the first inequality is by c.p.t.p. monotonicity of the trace norm distance, and the second is by
construction. Combining (86) and (87) with Fannes’ inequality for the quantum mutual information, we
obtain
I(K ;ΛEn,ρKΛEn ,p) = I(K ;ΛB
n, ρ˜KΛBn ,p)
≤ I(K ;ΛBn,ρKΛBn ,π)) + f (n‖p −π‖1) (88)
for each p ∈ P(Y ) \ {π}, where f is a function with f (a) > 0 for all a > 0, and f (a)→ 0, (a→ 0). Therefore,
we have for each p , π
logM ≤ H(Kp)− I(K ;ΛEn,ρKΛEn ,p) +µ
≤ H(Kp)− I(K ;ΛBn,ρKΛBn ,π) +µ+ f (n‖p −π‖1)
≤ H(Kp)− I (Kπ;K ′π) +µ+ f (n‖p −π‖1)
≤ H(Kp)−H(Kπ) +H (Kπ |K ′π) +µ+ f (n‖p −π‖1)
≤ H(Kp)−H(Kπ) +µ logM + h(µ) +µ+ f (n‖p −π‖1),
≤ µ logM + h(µ) +µ+2f (n‖p −π‖1), (89)
where the first inequality is (85), the second is by (88), the third is by the quantum data processing in-
equality, the fifth by Fano’s inequality together with (84), and the last is by Fannes’ inequality. By taking
the infimum over all p in the above inequality arrive at
logM ≤ µ logM + h(µ) +µ. (90)
We conclude that R = 0 is the only achievable forward secret-key distillation rate.
Remark 22. The lack of sender knowledge can have worst consequences. A closer look at the example intro-
duced to prove the preceding theorem shows, how different the situations with and without sender knowledge can
be. With sender knowledge, we achieve capacity with zero error and security index for each blocklength, while
all public forward communication needed is the information whether π is present or not. On the other hand,
the bound (90) reveals that no nonzero forward secret-key rate can be achieved even if nonzero asymptotically
performance µ is allowed asymptotically!
B. A weaker notion of regularity
In this section we show that a slightly weaker condition on the set I of cqq density matrices generating
the outputs of the compound source is sufficient for proving a version of Theorem 8. To formulate the
corresponding assertion, we introduce some notions from the theory of set-valued maps, where we take
the corresponding definitions from Chapter 11 in [10]. In the following we denote for each given setΩ the
power set ofΩ (i.e. the family of subsets ofΩ) by 2Ω .
Let f : Θ→ 2Ω be a set-valued map. We define for each E ⊂Ω
f +(E) := {θ ∈Θ : f (θ) ⊂ E}, and f −(E) := {θ ∈Θ : f (θ)∩E , ∅}. (91)
Definition 23. We call a set-valued map f : Θ→ 2Ω
1. upper hemi-continuous, if for each θ ∈ Θ the following is true. Whenever θ ∈ f +(E) for an open set E,
there is a neighbourhood U(θ) of θ with U(θ) ⊂ f +(E).
2. lower hemi-continuous, if for each θ ∈ Θ the following is true. Whenever θ ∈ f −(E) for an open set E,
there is a neighbourhood U(θ) of θ with U(θ) ⊂ f −(E).
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3. continuous, if f is both upper and lower hemi-continuous.
We will always regard Θ and Ω being finite-dimensional. In this case, we obtain sequential character-
izations of upper and lower hemi-continuity, if we assume the set-valued function to have only compact
values.
Proposition 24. Let f : Θ→ 2Ω be a set-valued map with Θ ⊂Rm, Ω ⊂Rk , and f (θ) compact for each θ ∈Θ.
It holds
1. f is upper hemi-continuous if and only if for each θ ∈ Θ, every sequence (θn)n∈N with θn → θ(n→∞)
and ωn ∈ f (θn), n ∈N there is a subsequence {ωnk }k∈N with limk→∞ωk ∈ f (θ).
2. lower hemi-continuous, if for each θ ∈Θ and sequence {θn}n∈N ⊂ Θ, and ω ∈ f (θ) from limn→∞θn = θ
it follows, that there is a sequence {ωn}n∈N with ωn ∈ f (θn), n ∈N and limn→∞ωn = ω.
Proof. See [10], Proposition 11.11.
For our considerations the closed-graph characterization of upper hemi-continuity will be of utility.
Theorem 25. Let Θ ⊂ Rm, Ω ⊂ Rk , f : Θ→ 2Ω be a set-valued map with Ω being compact. If the graph of f ,
i.e. the set
Grf := {(θ,ω) ∈Θ ×Ω : ω ∈ f (θ)} (92)
is closed, then f is upper hemi-continuous.
Proof. See for example Proposition 11.9 in [10]
We need the following basic Lemma.
Lemma 26. If a set-valued function is lower hemi-continuous, then its closure f (i.e. the function defined by
closing the graph of f ) is lower hemi-continuous as well.
Proof. Assume that there is a sequence {θn}n∈N with θn → θ and ω ∈ f (θ), such that no sequence {ωn}n∈N
exists with ωn ∈ f (θn) for all n ∈ N and ωn → ω. If ω is in f (θ), such a sequence always exists by lower
hemi-continuity of f . If ω is in f (θ) \ f (θ) the hypothesis is only true if ω is no point of accumulation of
f (θ), which contradicts the definition of f .
Definition 27. We call a set I ⊂ Scqq(HABE ) weakly regular, if the set-valued map
fAX : PI→ 2Scq(HAX ) (93)
p 7→ IAXp (94)
is lower hemi-continuous for X = B,E.
Proposition 28. Let I ⊂ Scqq(HABE ) be a weakly regular set of cqq density matrices. There exists a regular set
Iˆ ⊂ Scqq(HABE ) with
1. I ⊂ Iˆ
2. K→(I) ≤ K→(Iˆ).
3. Iˆ is regular
Proof. Assume I being parameterized as
I :=
ρ(p,V ) :
∑
x∈X
p(x) |x〉〈x| ⊗V (x)

(p,V )∈S
(95)
with
S :=
⋃
p∈PI
{p} × Vp (96)
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with sets PI ∈ P(X ), Vp ⊂ CQ(X ,HBE ), p ∈ PI. We define Iˆ as the closure of I. Obviously, the first condition
I ⊂ Iˆ stated in the proposition is fulfilled. We show that the two remaining conditions are also fulfilled.
Assume that (T ,D) is an (n,M,L,µ) forward secret-key distillation protocol for I. Since the performance
and security criteria in Definition 3 are defined in terms of functions being continuously dependent on the
cqq density matrix, it is clear that (T ,D) is an (n,M,L,µ) forward secret-key distillation protocol also for Iˆ,
which directly implies that also the second claim of the proposition is satisfied.
For validating the third claim we notice that since Iˆ is closed, the corresponding set-valued functions fAB
and fAE have closed graphs. Therefore both maps are upper hemi-continuous by Theorem 25. The hy-
pothesis of I being weakly regular, together with Lemma 26 ensures us that f AB and f AE are also lower
hemi-continuous. Therefore, they are continuous. Since the set of sender marginal distributions PIˆ deriv-
ing from Iˆ is a compact set, we infer that fAB, fAE are uniformly continuous, which implies that for each
ǫ > 0 we find a δ > 0, such that the implication
‖p − q‖1 < δ ⇒ dH (fAB(p), fAB(q)) + dH (fAE(p), fAE(q)) < ǫ (97)
for each p,q ∈ PIˆ. Since
dH (Iˆ
AB
p , Iˆ
AB
q ) + dH (Iˆ
AE
p , Iˆ
AE
q ) = dH (fAB(p), fAB(q)) + dH (fAE(p), fAE(q)) (98)
holds by definition, Iˆ is regular.
Theorem 29. Let I be a weakly regular set of cqq density matrices on HABE . It holds
K→(I) = lim
k→∞
1
k
K
(1)
→ (I⊗k ), (99)
Proof. We approximate I by the set Iˆ as defined in the proof of Proposition 28. The first and second
property of Iˆ in Proposition 28 together imply that
K→(I) = K→(Iˆ) = lim
k→∞
1
k
K
(1)
→ (Iˆ⊗k ) (100)
holds. The rightmost of the above inequalities is by application of Theorem 8 on Iˆ, which is possible,
because Iˆ is regular by Proposition 28. In fact, dH (I, Iˆ) = 0, and consequently dH (I
⊗k , Iˆ⊗k ) = 0 holds for
each k ∈N. Therefore
K
(1)
→ (I⊗k ) = K
(1)
→ (Iˆ⊗k) (101)
holds for each k ∈N by continuity of K (1). We are done.
VII. SPECIAL CASE: FORWARD SECRET-KEY DISTILLATION CAPACITYOF A CLASSICAL TRIPARTITE
COMPOUND SOURCES
Our results also cover the case of a completely classical tripartite compound source. Let (X,Y ,Z) be a
triple of classical random variables with distribution PXYZ ∈ P(X ×Y ×Z). The state of this classical system
coherified to a Hilbert space HX ⊗HY ⊗HZ is represented by the density matrix
ρ :=
∑
(x,y,z)∈X×Y×Z
PXYZ(x,y,z) |x〉 〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ |z〉〈z| . (102)
Forward secret-key distillation for this kind of classical compound memoryless source was considered in
[23] done under collaboration of one of the authors of the present paper. Among other results obtained
therein, it was derived a capacity formula for the case without sender marginal knowledge in case that
the set of sender marginal distributions deriving from the source is finite. Our results extend the capac-
ity description also to the case of an arbitrary regular tripartite classical source. By coherifying each set
(Xs ,Ys ,Zs)s∈S of triples into a mutually commuting set of density matrices as in (102), Theorem 8 directly
leads to a version of Theorem 2 in [23] where the assumption on the set of sender marginal states to be
finite can be replaced by the substantially weaker assumption of regularity of the source. Theorem 9 in
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the same way provides a capacity formula for the case where the sender party perfectly knows the distri-
bution of his/her part of the source. The reader may reply that the definition of a (deterministic) classical
decoding procedure is more restricting than that of a POVM in quantum theory, since the decoding sets
are demanded to be pairwise non-intersecting. Our reasoning is not affected by this fact, because in case
of pairwise commuting density operators, optimal decoding can always be achieved by using projection
valued measures. Alternatively, one could replace Lemma 11 by a completely classical version.
We point out that the need for a regularity condition as well as differences between the capacities with
and without sender’s knowledge of the marginal state are not effects of the quantum nature of the sources
considered in this paper. The reader may notice that the example given to prove Theorem 21 is essentially
classical, since all density matrices involved pairwise commute.
Since there are stronger preresults available in classical information theory (especially regarding error
exponents for coding of classical compound channels), a classical method of proof might lead to faster
decrease of error with a potentially simplified proof.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have considered the task of secret-key distillation under free forward classical communication for
compound memoryless sources with classical legitimate sender and quantum legal receiver and eaves-
dropper outputs. We derived a capacity formula for all sources of this class which additionally exhibit a
certain regularity condition.
We also discussed the situation, where the legitimate sender has perfect knowledge of the probability dis-
tribution governing his/her outputs. In this case, we were able to derive a capacity formula which equals
the one given for the case without sender marginal information for regular sources, and moreover does
hold for all non-regular sources.
As we have also seen, the capacities with and without sender marginal information differ at least for some
non-regular sources. We admit that the regularity conditions assumed in this paper may be somewhat
weakened to determine the forward secret-key generation capacity without sender knowledge for a larger
class of sources. We provided a further step in this direction by applying the general theory of set-valued
maps to derive a slightly broader class of compound cqq sources with a general capacity description.
We leave open the more general case of proving a capacity theorem for forward secret-key distillation
from compound sources where the generating set of density matrices may contain members being not in
the class of cqq density matrices. In [15] such a theorem were proven in case of a perfectly known source
without restriction on the legitimate sender to be classical.
The strategy therein to prove a coding theorem was, to combine an achievability result for cqq sources
with an optimization over instruments dephasing the sender’s system to a classical one. Notice that such
a strategy in general does not apply to compound sources in a direct way as it did in [15] (at least in case
that the sender does not have perfect marginal knowledge). In general, there is no control whether or not
a dephasing operation leads to a non-regular compound cqq source.
However, the approximation techniques presented here may lead to a better understanding of the secret-
key distillation task even for tripartite quantum compound sources.
Another astonishing result from Ref.15 is the close correspondence between the forward secret-key distil-
lation and one-way LOCC entanglement distillation tasks. It was demonstrated that modifying forward
secret-key distillation protocols leads to one-way local operations and classical communications protocols
suitable for proving the so-called quantum hashing bound which is used to determinine the one-way en-
tanglement distillation capacity of bipartite memoryless quantum sources.
The authors of this paper are of the opinion that following a similar strategy to derive the entanglement
distillation capacity of bipartite compound memoryless quantum sources may be not successful in the
same way as it is with perfect knowledge of the source. A closer look to the corresponding considerations
in [15] may underpin this opinion. Therein, an important part of the coding strategy was to apply a non-
destructive measurement on the sender’s marginal of the bipartite quantum state subject to entanglement
distillation – a strongly state-dependent task, which can hardly be performed without sender marginal
knowledge. For a generalization to the case of bipartite compound quantum sources under assumption of
SMI, the strategy may be feasible. We did not pursue this path, because the one-way entanglement distil-
lation capacity of compound quantum sources is already known from Refs. 6, and 7.
This parallels a similar observation made for channel coding from [8]. Therein, it was argued that the
ingenuous way to derive entanglement generation codes for quantum channels from codes for secret mes-
sage transmission over classical-quantum wiretap channels used in [16] for proving the quantum coding
theorem leads to suboptimal results for compound channels if no sender state knowledge is assumed.
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Appendix A: Universal random constant composition codes for compound DMcq Channels
In this section, we state and prove some results on compound DMcq channels we need within the proof
of Lemma 11. For convenience of the reader, we first provide definitions, necessary to understand the
subsequent arguments. Let V ⊂ CQ(X ,K) be a set of cq channels mapping a finite alphabet X to the set of
density matrices on aHilbert spaceK. The compound discrete memoryless classical quantum channel generated
by V (the DMcqC V for short) is given by the family {V ⊗n : V ∈ V }n∈N of possible outputs. To catch up with
the notation from [4], we sometimes write V = {Vs}s∈S assuming a suitable parameterization of V by an
index set S. For given blocklength n ∈N,M ∈N, an (n,M)-code for transmission of classical messages over V
is a family C := (um,Dm)Mm=1 with um ∈ X n, Dm ∈ L(K⊗n) for each m ∈ [M], with the additional property that
for all m ∈ [M]
0 ≤Dm ≤ 1⊗nK , and
M∑
m=1
Dm ≤ 1⊗nK
holds. For given (n,M)-code C, s ∈ S, we define the average error of transmission by
e(C,V ⊗ns ) :=
1
M
M∑
m=1
tr(D⊥mV ⊗n(um)),
where we allow ourselves to define A⊥ := 1⊗nK −A (even if A is not a projector). The following two Propo-
sitions combined, immediately imply the proof of Lemma 11 stated in the text. The claim of the first
one follows by careful modification of the proof of Theorem 5.10 from [4] and delivers for each large
enough blocklength and each type of sequences a suitable random compound transmission code having
super-polynomially decrease of error, universal regarding the channels in the compound set, as well as the
appearing types.
Proposition 30. Let W ⊂ CQ(X ,K) be an arbitrary set of cq channels. For each δ > 0, there is a number
n2 := n2(δ) such that for each n > n2 and each type λ ∈ T(n,X ) there exists a random (n,Mλ)-code Cλ(U ) :=
(Um,Dm(U ))
Mλ
m=1 forW with the following properties
1. U := (U1, ...,UMλ ) is an i.i.d. sequence of random variables, each with values in X n and distribution λ⊗n.
2. Mλ ≥ exp
{
n
(
inf
W∈W
χ(λ,W )− δ
)}
.
3. E
[
sup
W∈W
e(Cλ,W⊗n)
]
≤ 2− 16
√
nc(δ)
with a constant c(δ) > 0.
Proof. The assertion is basically contained in the proof of Theorem 5.10 in [4] and follows by minor modi-
fications of the argument given there. We assume the reader’s familiarity with the arguments presented in
[4] and restrict ourselves to indicate the steps of modification necessary to justify our claim.
We writeW := {Wt}t∈T with a suitable index set T . Let n ∈N, and consider a type λ ∈ T(n,X ). Assume that
inf
t∈T χ(λ,Wt )− δ > 0, (A1)
holds, since otherwise the claim is trivially fulfilled for λ. Choose an approximating setWn := {W ′t }t∈Tn forW as used in [4]. We will execute the suggestions given in Remark 5.11 therein, and therefore choose the
diameter of the partition of output states used to defineWn to be 2− 16
√
n instead of 1
n2
. Define
Ωλ,n := {ρ′t,λ :=
∑
x∈X
λ(x) |x〉〈x| ⊗W ′t (x) : t ∈ Tn},
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λ :=
∑
x∈X
λ(x) |x〉〈x| , and σ ′t,λ :=
∑
x∈X
λ(x)σ ′t (x) (t ∈ Tn).
Note that the properties of the set Wn in [4] (see Lemma 5.6 therein) together with the above definitions,
implies the bound
λmin(λ⊗ σ ′t,λ) ≥ min
x∈supp(λ)
λ(x) · 1
d
· 2− 16
√
n
≥ 2
− 16√n
n · d (A2)
on the minimal eigenvalue λmin(λ ⊗ σ ′t,λ) of λ ⊗ σ ′t,λ. The last estimate above follows from the fact that λ
is a type of sequences in X n. Closely following the argument given in [4], we are ensured that choosing
ln = [
√
n], we find an,bn ∈N, 0 ≤ bn < ln, with
n = anln + bn,
and a projection-valued measureMln ,λ := {P1,ln ,λ,P2,ln ,λ}, such that for all t, s ∈ Tn
SMln,λ (ρ
′⊗ln
t,λ ||(λ⊗ σλ,s)⊗ln ) ≥ ln(S(Ωλ,n ||λ⊗ σ ′λ,s)− ξln (λ⊗ σ ′λ,s)
≥ ln(min
t∈Tn
χ(λ,W ′t )− ξln(λ⊗ σ ′λ,s)) (A3)
holds. Careful investigation of the function ξln in [4] using the type-independent bound in (A2) shows
that
lim
n→∞ maxλ∈T(n,X )
max
s∈Tn
ξln (λ⊗ σ ′λ,s) = 0 (A4)
holds. Introducing the refinement Qln ,λ of the projection-valued measure Mln ,λ, and the stochastic ma-
trices Vt,λ, t ∈ Tn generated by Qln ,λ as in [4] (note that these, also may depend on the chosen type λ), it
holds
1
ln
min
t∈Tn
I(λ⊗ln ,Vt,λ) ≥ inf
t∈T
χ(λ,Wt )− n · 2−
16√nC(d)− ξln,max,
where we used ξln,max defined by
ξln ,max := maxλ∈T(n,X )
max
s∈Tn
ξln (λ⊗ σ ′λ,s).
Since (A4) holds, we find for each 0 < η < δ a number n2(η) ∈N (independent of λ) such that
1
ln
min
t∈Tn
I(λ⊗ln ,Vt,λ) ≥ inf
t∈T
χ(λ,Wt)− η > 0 (A5)
is fulfilled for all n > n2. Note that the last inequality holds by (A1). The bound above differs a bit from
the one given in Eq. (30) in [4]. However, it will be sufficient for the following argument. Let
Θ :=
{
θ ∈R : 0 < θ < η
4
}
, (A6)
and
In,λ := min
t∈Tn
I(λ⊗ln ,Vt,λ).
Following the lines of [4] (always respecting dependencies on λ), we yield the bound
Pr(i
an
λ ≤ In,λ − 2lnθ) ≤
1
|Tn|
∑
t∈Tn
Pr
t,λ
(i
an
t,λ ≤ In − lnθ) + |Tn|2−anlnθ .
Since i
an
t,λ is a sum of i.i.d. random variables each with values in the interval
[−lnd 16
√
n, lnd
16
√
n],
38
and
In,λ ≤Et,λ(iant,λ)
holds for each t ∈ Tn, our counterpart to Eq. (34) in [4],
Pr(i
an
t,λ ≤ In − lθ) ≤ e
anθ
2
16· 16√n
is valid. By closely following the lines of [4] (having in mind our bounds) together with the choice θ =
η
4 ,
we know that there is a projection Pn,λ,θ with
tr(ρ
(n)
λ Pn,λ,θ ) ≥ 1− e
anη
2
162 16
√
n − |Tn|2−anln
η
4
and
tr((λ⊗n ⊗ σ(n)λ )Pn,λ,θ ) ≤ 2−an(In−2lnθ)
≤ 2−anln(inft∈T χ(λ,Wt )−
3
2η), (A7)
where the last of the above inequalities above holds by (A5). Since b <
√
n,
tr((λ⊗n ⊗ σ(n)λ )Pn,λ,θ ) ≤ 2
−n(inf
t∈T
χ(λ,Wt )−2η)
(A8)
holds for each n > n2, if n2 is chosen large enough. Setting η :=
δ
2 , and using the bounds in (A7) and
(A8) together with Theorem 1.1. stated in the Appendix of [4] (and leaving out the derandomization
step leading to a deterministic code in the Proof of Theorem 5.10 in [4]), we conclude that there is an
(n,M ′λ) random code Cλ(U ) := (Um,Dm(U ))M
′
m=1 for the average channel W
⊗n := 1|Tn |
∑
t∈TnW
′⊗n
t with U =
(U1, . . . ,UM ′ ) being a sequence of i.i.d. random variables each with values in X n and generic distribution
λ⊗n, such that
1. M ≥
⌊
exp
{
n
(
inf
t∈T
χ(λWt)− 32δ
)}⌋
.
2. E
[
e(Cλ,W⊗n)
] ≤ 2− 16√nc˜(δ)
with a positive constant c˜(δ) > 0. From this, we can conclude that there is a number n0(δ), such that for
each n > n0(δ) (independent of λ) Cλ is an (n,M) random code of the above stated properties, with 2. above
replaced by
E
[
sup
W∈W
e(Cλ,W⊗n)
]
≤ 2− 16
√
nc(η),
where c(δ) := 12 c˜(δ).
The following proposition is a compound version of Proposition 2.5 in [15]. It is proven by exactly the
same strategy replacing the Holevo-Schumacher-Westmoreland codes for DMcqC with perfectly known
generic cq channel by the codes constructed in [4] together with the modifications done in Proposition 30
above.
Proposition 31 (cf. [15], Prop. 2.5). Let W ⊂ CQ(X ,K) be an arbitrary set of cq channels, n ∈ N and λ ∈
T(n,X ) a type of sequences in X n. If there exists a random (n,M ′)-classical message transmission code
C′(U ) = (Um,Dm(U ))M ′m=1
for the DMcqCW which has the properties
1. U := (U1, . . . ,UM ′ ) is an i.i.d. sequence of random variables with values in X n with generic distribution λn
2. E
[
sup
W∈W
e(C,W⊗n)
]
≤ µ
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with µ ∈ (0,1), then there exists for each given ϑ ∈ (0,1) a random (n,M)-message transmission code
C(V ) := (Vm,Dm(V ))Mm=1
having the properties
1. V := (V1, ...,VM ) is an i.i.d. sequence of random variables, each equidistributed on T
n
λ ,
2. M = ⌊ϑ · (n+1)−|X | ·M ′⌋,
3. and
E
[
sup
W∈W
e(C′ ,W⊗n)
]
≤ 2
ϑ
(n+1)|X |µ+2−M
′(1−ϑ)2(n+1)−|X |/ ln2.
For proving the above assertion, we will make use of the following variant of the Chernov bound
Proposition 32. Let n ∈ N, δ > 0 and X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) be an i.i.d. sequence of random variables with 0 ≤
X1, . . . ,Xn ≤ 1 and E[Xi] = E, i ∈ [n], then
Pr
1n
n∑
i=1
Xi ≤ (1− δ)E
 ≤ 2−nδ2E2/ ln2
Proof of Proposition 31. Define the event that at leastM codewords of a codebook u are λ-typical sequences
by
A(M) :=
{
u = (u1, . . . ,uM ′ ) ∈ X nM ′ : |{m : um ∈ T nλ }| ≥M
}
.
For an i.i.d. sequence U = (U1, . . . ,UM ′ ) as in the hypotheses of the proposition, it holds
Pr (A(M)c) = Pr

M ′∑
i=1
1T nλ
(Um) <M
 .
Notice that
E[1T nλ (Um)] = λ
n(T nλ ) ≥ (n+1)−|X |
holds. The rightmost inequality above holds by the fact that among all typical sets of words in X n, T nλ has
the largest probability w.r.t. λn.
We fix ϑ ∈ (0,1) and setM := ⌊ϑ(n+1)−|X |M ′⌋. We obtain
Pr (A(M)c) ≤ Pr

M ′∑
i=1
1T nλ
(Um) <M

≤ Pr
 1M ′
M ′∑
i=1
1T nλ
(Um) < ϑ(n+1)
−|X |

≤ Pr
 1M ′
M ′∑
i=1
1T nλ
(Um) < ϑE[U1]

≤ exp
{
−M ′(1−ϑ)2E[U1]/ ln2)
}
(A9)
≤ exp
{
−M ′(1−ϑ)2(n+1)−|X |)/ ln2
}
=: τ.
Except the one in Eq. (A9), which is by application of the bound in Proposition 32, all of the above
estimates are by the preceding definitions and bounds.
Next, define a function ϕ : X nM ′ → (T nλ )M by
ϕ(u) :=
{
(v1, . . . ,vM ) = v if u ∈ A(M)
(v˜, . . . v˜) otherwise,
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where v˜ is any word from T nλ . By symmetry, it holds
λnM
′
(ϕ−1(v)) = λ
nM ′ (A(M))
|T nλ |
,
i.e. the push forward measure λnM
′ ◦ϕ−1 of λnM ′ under ϕ is nearly equidistributed. Explicitly,
∥∥∥∥π⊗MT nλ −λnM
′ ◦ϕ−1
∥∥∥∥
1
= |1−λnM ′ (A(M))| = λnM ′ (A(M)c) < τ.
For each outcome v = (v1, . . . ,vM ) ∈ T nMλ , we define an (n,M)-message transmission code C(v) := (vm′ ,Dm′ )Mm′=1
as follows. Let
uv := argmin
u∈ϕ−1(v)
sup
t∈T
e(C′(u),W⊗nt ), (A10)
and Dm′ :=Dm(uv ) for the respectivem (i.e. (uv,m,Dm(uv)) is a pair of codeword and decoding set in C′(uv ).)
Then
sup
t∈T
e(C(v),W⊗nt ) = sup
t∈T
1
M
M∑
m=1
tr
(
Dm(v)
⊥W⊗nt (vm)
)
≤ sup
t∈T
1
M
M ′∑
m=1
tr
(
D⊥m(uv )W
⊗n
t (uv,m)
)
≤ M
′
M
sup
t∈T
e(C′(uv ),W⊗nt )
=
M ′
M
min
u∈ϕ−1(v)
sup
t∈T
e(C′(uv ),W⊗nt ).
The last equality above is by our code definition from Eq. (A10). To each u ∈ A(M)c, we assign some valid
(n,M)-code C(ϕ(u)) := (v0,m,Dm)Mm=1 being of no further interest. Let Vˆ = ϕ(U ) (which is not i.i.d. so far!),
then C(Vˆm,Dm(Vˆ ))Mm=1 is a random constant composition (n,M)-code with
E
[
sup
t∈T
e(C(Vˆ ),W⊗nt )
]
=
∑
v∈ϕ(A(M))
λnM
′
(ϕ−1(v)) sup
t∈T
e(C(v),W⊗nt )
+
∑
v∈ϕ(A(M)c)
λnM
′
(ϕ−1(v)) sup
t∈T
e(C(v),W⊗nt )
<
∑
v∈ϕ(A(M))
λnM
′
(ϕ−1(v)) sup
t∈T
e(C(v),W⊗nt ) + τ
≤ M
′
M
∑
u∈A(M)
λnM
′
(u) sup
t∈T
e(C′(u),W⊗nt ) + τ
≤ M
′
M
E
[
sup
t∈T
e(C′(u),W⊗nt )
]
+ τ
≤ M
′
M
µ+ τ.
Now, let V = (V1, . . . ,VM ) be a sequence of i.i.d. random variables each equidistributed on T
n
λ . And C(V ) :=
(Vm,Dm(V ))
M
m=1. It holds
M ′
M
E
[
sup
t∈T
e(C′(u),W⊗nt )
]
≤ M
′
M
E
[
sup
t∈T
e(C′(u),W⊗nt )
]
+
∥∥∥∥π⊗MT nλ −λnM
′ ◦ϕ−1
∥∥∥∥
1
<
M ′
M
µ+2τ.
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Since
M ′
M
≤ 2
ϑ
(n+1)|X |,
we are done.
Appendix B: Continuity bounds
For convenience of the reader, we state and prove several continuity properties of entropic quantities.
Most of them follow straightforwardly from the Alicki-Fannes bound [3] for von Neumann entropies.
Theorem 33 ([3]). Let ρ,σ ∈ S (KA ⊗KB) be states on KA ⊗KB with ‖ρ −σ‖ ≤ ǫ. It holds
|S(A|B,ρ)− S(A|B,σ)| ≤ 4ǫ logdimKA +2h(ǫ),
where h(x) := −x logx − (1− x) log(1− x) is the binary Shannon entropy of (x,1− x).
The following bound is easily derived from Theorem 33.
Lemma 34. Let p,q ∈ P(Y ) be probability distributions with ‖p − q‖1 ≤ ǫ. For each cq-channel V ∈ CQ(Y ,K), it
holds
|χ(p,V )−χ(q,V )| ≤ 6ǫ logdimK+2h(ǫ).
Lemma 35. Let Q,Q′ ⊂ P(Y ) be probability distributions with dH (Q,Q′) ≤ ǫ. For each set V ⊂ CQ(Y ,KB ⊗KE)∣∣∣∣∣∣infq∈Q
(
inf
V∈V
χ(p,VB)− sup
V∈V
χ(q,VE )
)
− inf
q∈Q′
(
inf
V∈V
χ(p,VB)− sup
V∈V
χ(q,VE )
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 6ǫ logdimKBE +4h(ǫ).
Lemma 36. Let I,J ⊂ Scqq(Y ,KX ) of cqq density matrices and dH (I,J) ≤ Γ, and with stochastic matrices PU |Y :
Y → P(U ) and PT |U : U → P(T )
ρ˜ :=
∑
t∈T
∑
u∈U
∑
y∈Y
PT |U (t|u)PU |Y (u|y)p(y) |u〉 〈u| ⊗ |t〉〈t| ⊗V (y)
if
ρ :=
∑
y∈Y
p(y) |y〉〈y| ⊗V (y).
Then, the inequalities
inf
ρ∈I
I(U ;X |T , ρ˜) ≥ inf
ρ∈J
I(U ;X |T , ρ˜)− 8∆ log(|U | ·dimK)− 6h(∆)
sup
ρ∈I
I(U ;X |T , ρ˜) ≤ sup
ρ∈J
I(U ;X |T , ρ˜) + 8∆ log(|U | ·dimK) + 6h(∆)
are valid.
Proof. It holds for any two states ρ,σ ∈ Scqq(Y ,KX )
‖ρ˜ − σ˜‖1 ≤ ‖ρ −σ‖1. (B1)
Note that for each cqq density matrix ρ, it holds
I(U ;X |T , ρ˜) = S(U |T , ρ˜) + S(X |T , ρ˜)− S(UX |ρ˜).
by definition of the quantum mutual information. If ρ,σ fulfill ‖ρ −σ‖1 ≤ δ, then
|I(U ;X |T , ρ˜)− I(U ;X |T ,σ˜)| ≤ 8δ log(|U | ·dimK) + 6h(δ) (B2)
holds by (B1) and application of Lemma 33. From (B2) and the assumptions, we directly infer the claims.
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Appendix C: Proof of Eq. (67)
Let λ ∈ Tˆ and p ∈ Pλ. We define for each q ∈ Pλ the set
IB(p,q) :=

∑
y∈Y
p(y) |y〉〈y| ⊗VB : V ∈ Vq
 .
Observe the relations
IˆBp,λ =
⋃
q∈Pλ
IB(p,q), and I
B
p = I
B
(p,p).
assume V ∈ Vp, V ′ ∈ Vq. It holds∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
y∈Y
p(y) |y〉〈y| ⊗V (y)−
∑
y∈Y
p(y) |y〉 〈y| ⊗V ′(y)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
=
∑
y∈Y
‖p(y)V (y)− p(y)V ′(y)‖1
≤
∑
y∈Y
‖p(y)V (y)− q(y)V ′(y)‖1 + ‖p − q‖1,
from which we directly infer
dH (I
B
p ,I(p,q)) ≤ dH (IBp ,IBq ) + ‖p − q‖1.
Using these facts together with the first claim of Lemma 36, we obtain
inf
ρ∈Iˆp,λ
I(Uλ;B|Tλ, ρ˜) = inf
σ∈IˆBp,λ
I(Uλ;B|Tλ, σ˜ )
= inf
q∈Pλ
inf
σ∈IB(p,q)
I(Uλ;B|Tλ, σ˜)
≥ inf
σ∈IBp
I(Uλ;B|Tλ, σ˜ )− 8∆ log(|U | ·dimKB)− 6h(∆)
= inf
ρ∈Ip
I(Uλ;B|Tλ, ρ˜)− 8∆ log(|U | ·dimKB)− 6h(∆) (C1)
Applying a similar reasoning leads us to
sup
ρ∈Iˆp,λ
I(Uλ;E|Tλ, ρ˜) ≤ sup
ρ∈Ip
I(Uλ;E|Tλ, ρ˜)− 8∆ log(|U | ·dimKE)− 6h(∆). (C2)
Combination of (C1) and (C2) for all p ∈ Pλ yields the desired bound
inf
ρ∈Iˆp,λ
I(Uλ;B|Tλ, ρ˜)− sup
ρ∈Iˆp,λ
I(Uλ;E|Tλ, ρ˜)
≥ inf
ρ∈Ip
I(Uλ;B|Tλ, ρ˜)− sup
ρ∈Ip
I(Uλ;E|Tλ, ρ˜)− 16∆ log(|U | ·dimKBE)− 12h(∆).
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